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ABSTRACT
Employment rates in Puerto Rico range from 55 to 65 percent of U.S. rates during the past thirty
years. This huge employment shortfall holds for men and women, cuts across all education groups,
and is deeper for persons without a college degree. The shortfall is concentrated in the private sector,
especially labor-intensive industries that rely heavily on less educated workers.  Motivated by these
facts, we identify several factors that undermine employment growth and business development,
including  high  minimum  wage  requirements,  a  history  of  tax  incentives  for  capital-intensive
activities, a host of regulatory entry barriers, and a business climate in which profitability and
survival too often rest on the ability to secure favors from the government,. We pay close attention
to the permitting process whereby the government oversees and regulates construction and real estate
development projects, the commercial use of equipment and facilities, and the periodic renewal of
various business licenses.  Based on interviews with experts and  participants in the permitting
process, and supplemented by other sources, we compile evidence that the permitting process is
excessively slow and costly, fraught with uncertainty, subject to capricious outcomes, susceptible
to corruption, and prone to manipulation by business rivals and special interest groups.
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1. Introduction  
The employment rate among Puerto Rican residents is stunningly low, and it has 
been so for decades. Household census data for 1980, 1990 and 2000 yield employment 
rates in the neighborhood of 40% for persons 16 to 65 years of age. Comparable data for 
the United States yield employment rates in the range of 65 to 70%. The OECD reports 
an average employment rate of 66% for member countries in 2000, and Turkey, at 49%, 
is the only OECD member with an employment rate below 54%.
1 These comparisons 
underscore the puzzle presented by Puerto Rico’s persistently low employment rate. 
This paper investigates the employment record in Puerto Rico and its climate for 
business development. The paper has three related goals. One is to shed new light on the 
reasons for Puerto Rico’s low employment rate by taking a close look at its employment 
structure. Another is to highlight some longer term consequences of Puerto Rico’s 
business climate and chronically weak employment performance. A third goal is to 
identify government policies and institutional arrangements that impede employment 
growth and business development.  
In terms of our third goal, we pay close attention to the permitting process 
whereby the government oversees and regulates construction and real estate development 
projects, the commercial use of equipment and facilities, and the periodic renewal of 
various business licenses. Several factors contribute to Puerto Rico’s poor employment 
performance, but there are good reasons to suspect that the permitting process is one 
important obstacle to business development and employment growth. Anecdotal evidence 
suggests that the permitting process is excessively slow and costly, fraught with 
uncertainty, subject to capricious outcomes, susceptible to corruption, and prone to 
manipulation by business rivals, politicians and special interest groups. Problems and 
inefficiencies in the permitting process raise the costs of creating new business 
establishments, undercutting the drive for employment growth. Sizable fixed costs in 
learning how to navigate the system fall more heavily on smaller and younger businesses 
                                                 
1 The OECD statistics are taken from Table B in the Statistical Annex to the 2004 issue of the OECD 
Employment Outlook. The statistics for Puerto Rico and the United States reflect our tabulations of 
household census data. It is worth remarking that the OECD figure for the 2000 U.S. employment rate is 
five percentage points higher than our census-based figure, implying that the two data sources are not fully 
compatible.  There are also concerns about the accuracy of the Puerto Rican household census data, as we 
discuss below. However, there is little doubt regarding the central point that Puerto Rico has a remarkably 
low rate of employment.   3 
and on would-be entrepreneurs who lack political connections. For these reasons, the 
permitting process is also likely to repress the emergence of a productive entrepreneurial 
culture, or drive it into the underground sector. 
  The permitting process is one aspect of an obtrusive and often counterproductive 
role for government in Puerto Rico’s economy.  There are many others.  Section 936 
provisions in the U.S. tax code distorted Puerto Rico’s industry structure at great cost to 
the U.S. treasury with few benefits for Puerto Rican residents (Pelzman, 2002, Hunter, 
2003, and Bosworth and Collins, 2005). Puerto Rico’s own tax code is replete with 
provisions that benefit special business interests at the expense of the general welfare. 
Various “buy local” laws and tax provisions lessen competitive pressures on local 
business interests by disfavoring foreign producers. Regulatory entry barriers abound.  
The Jones Act raises the cost of international trade by requiring the use of American 
vessels for goods shipped by water between U.S. and Puerto Rican ports.  Puerto Rican 
employers are subject to U.S. minimum wage requirements, even though the average 
Puerto Rican wage is roughly half the average U.S. wage. Government transfer payments 
account for more than a quarter of Puerto Rican household incomes in recent decades 
(Burtless and Sotomayor, 2005). And the Puerto Rican government has traditionally 
accounted for a large share of employment and production activity on the island, much 
larger than in the United States.  
  A truly striking feature of Puerto Rico’s economy is the underdeveloped state of 
its private sector. Private sector employment rates in Puerto Rico are less than half the 
U.S. rates in recent decades. Even fewer Puerto Rican residents have first-hand 
experience, as owners or employees, in “free enterprise” organizations – private 
businesses that operate in the formal economy without large government subsidies, 
special tax breaks and regulatory advantages, or heavy-handed oversight by government 
bureaucracies.  
These observations about Puerto Rico’s economy point to some key challenges 
and concerns.  First, chronically low employment rates imply that Puerto Rican residents   4 
are short on work experience, opportunities for learning on the job and marketable skills.
2  
Second, the management skills and business savvy required for a thriving entrepreneurial 
class are likely to be in especially short supply. Relatively few Puerto Ricans work in the 
private sector, and business persons have learned to focus their creative energies on how 
to curry favor with government officials and circumvent bureaucratic obstacles to 
commercial success, rather than how to develop and execute business models that can 
withstand the rigors of competition in an unfettered marketplace.  Even if reform creates 
an institutional framework that is advantageous for productive entrepreneurial activity 
and long term growth, it will be difficult to rapidly upgrade business skills and reorient a 
rent-seeking business culture. Third, most Puerto Ricans have a strong financial stake in 
maintaining certain aspects of an expansive public sector – as salaried government 
employees, as recipients of transfer payments and public sector pensions, or as 
beneficiaries of government contract awards, subsidies, tax breaks and special regulatory 
advantages. This web of vested interests in a highly socialized economy presents a 
formidable barrier to effective economic reform.  
  The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 investigates the structure of employment 
in Puerto Rico with a focus on comparisons to the United States. Section 3 considers 
several policies and institutions that shape the climate for business development and 
employment growth in Puerto Rico. Section 4 considers the permitting process in some 
detail. We draw on a variety of sources for our study of the permitting process, including 
personal interviews with more than one hundred business persons, real estate developers, 
construction contractors, government officials and outside experts. Section 5 summarizes 
our main results and distills a few conclusions. 
 
2. A Comparative Perspective on Employment in Puerto Rico 
2.1. Private, Public and Free Enterprise Employment Rates  
There is an enormous gap between employment rates in Puerto Rico and the United 
States. As reported in Table 1, only 37.5% of Puerto Rican residents (16-65 years old) 
held a job during the reference week of the 2000 household census, compared to 68.8% 
                                                 
2 The importance of work experience and on-the-job training for skill formation and earnings growth are 
recurring themes in modern labor economics. See, Mincer (1962) and Becker (1993, chapter 2) for seminal 
contributions.    5 
for the United States. Census data also show an enormous employment gap in 1980 and 
1990. Figure 1 draws on perennial labor force surveys rather than the decennial 
household census to plot employment rates from 1947 to 2001. The labor force survey 
presents a less dire picture in recent years than the 2000 census, but it confirms that 
Puerto Rico’s employment rate is remarkably low in recent decades.
3    
Figure 1 reveals several other interesting facts. Puerto Rico’s employment situation 
was much stronger at the midpoint of the 20
th century, with an employment shortfall 
relative to the United States of less than seven percentage points. U.S. employment rates 
drifted upward over the next five decades, but they fell sharply in Puerto Rico – by 7 
percentage points in the 1950s, and by another 10 percentage points from 1973 to 1982 
before recovering some lost ground.  Figure 1 also shows that the U.S.-Puerto Rican 
employment gap widened greatly for both sexes after the early 1950s, from 5 to 25 
percentage points among women and from 10 to 20 percentage points among men. 
These data indicate that, since 1975, Puerto Rican residents have been accumulating 
work experience at only 55-65% of the rate in the United States. This huge experience 
deficit is a negative legacy of Puerto Rico’s chronically weak employment performance, 
and it cannot be erased over night.
4 It will depress the earnings potential of Puerto Ricans 
for years to come. By the same token, strong and sustained increases in the employment-
population ratio are essential for long term development of Puerto Rico’s human capital.  
The U.S.-Puerto Rican gap in private sector employment rates is even more extreme. 
According to Census data, only 28 percent of Puerto Rican adults worked in the private 
sector in 2000, less than half the 58 percent figure for the mainland. A similar pattern 
prevails in 1980 and 1990.  These private sector employment figures overstate first-hand 
exposure to employment in the unfettered “free enterprise” segment of the formal 
                                                 
3 Bosworth and Collins (2005) raise questions about the reliability of the Puerto Rican household census, 
especially the 2000 census.  Based on comparisons to the labor force survey and payroll records, Bosworth 
and Collins conclude that the 2000 census seriously understates the participation rate (and presumably the 
employment rate).  Their Table 6 shows that the participation rate in the 2000 census is about five 
percentage points below the rate in the labor force survey. The accuracy of the Puerto Rican labor force 
survey has also been called into question. See Rivera-Batiz and Santiago (1996).  In any event, all sources 
show a huge U.S.-Puerto Rican gap in employment rates. We rely heavily on the household census for our 
study, because several of our empirical exercises require large samples of individual workers. 
4 A careful effort to quantify the experience deficit among Puerto Rican residents would account for work 
experience accumulated on the mainland by return migrants and any U.S.-Puerto Rican difference in 
average hours worked by employed persons. We address the latter issue shortly.   6 
economy. Indeed, many Puerto Ricans with private sector jobs work in industries with a 
major role for government employment (e.g., hospitals, schools), industries that owe their 
Puerto Rican operations to special tax subsidies (e.g., pharmaceuticals), or industries that 
face costly bureaucratic obstacles to business activity (e.g., construction). Similar 
remarks apply to many private sector jobs in the United States, but the government’s role 
is typically more extensive on the island, as shown by some of our evidence below. 
Table 1 reports the fraction of Puerto Rican adults who work in the free enterprise 
segment of the economy, defined as private sector employment less non-governmental 
employees in Public Utilities and Sanitary Services, Primary and Secondary Education, 
Colleges and Universities, and several smaller industries for which public sector 
employment exceeds 35% of industry employment.
5  We also exclude Construction from 
the free enterprise segment because of the major role played by the government 
bureaucracy in construction and development projects, an issue treated at length in 
Section 4. We do not exclude Pharmaceuticals or other industries that receive large 
government subsidies or special tax breaks, although the Puerto Rican operations of such 
industries do not reflect unfettered free enterprise outcomes. Based on our classification, 
less than one-quarter of Puerto Rican adults work in the free enterprise segment of the 
economy.
6 
Low levels of work experience in free enterprise activity are potentially important for 
at least three reasons. First, jobs in the free enterprise segment probably require 
somewhat different skills and work habits than jobs in the public and regulated sectors. 
This view resonates with evidence that experience-related human capital is imperfectly 
portable across industries (Neal, 1995 and Parent, 2000) and evidence that many 
displaced workers suffer large, persistent earnings losses (e.g., Jacobson et al., 1993). 
                                                 
5 We have not systematically subtracted non-governmental employees in all industries for which public 
sector employment exceeds a specified threshold, although that would be a reasonable approach. A separate 
issue involves the manner of achieving consistency between Puerto Rico and the United States in defining 
the free enterprise segment. We opted for a uniform list of industries that are designated as outside the free 
enterprise segment in both Puerto Rico and the United States. An alternative approach would allow the 
designated list of industries to differ between the two, recognizing industry-level differences between 
Puerto Rico and the United States in public sector employment shares and the extent of government 
involvement. 
6 Excluding Pharmaceuticals, the percentage of Puerto Rican adults working in the free enterprise segment 
of the economy is 21.0% in 1980, 23.7% in 1990 and 22.9% in 2000.     7 
Thus, the skills and earnings potential acquired through work experience in the public 
and regulated sectors may not easily transfer to free enterprise work activity. 
Second, private sector work experience is a more powerful incubator of 
entrepreneurial skills and ambitions than jobs in the public and regulated sectors. This 
proposition finds support in previous research on the propensity to become a business 
owner and the determinants of business success. Studies consistently find that self 
employment and business ownership rates are much higher among children of business 
owners.
7 Based on U.S. data, Fairlie and Robb (2003) report that half of all business 
owners had a self-employed family member prior to starting a business, where “family 
member” means a spouse, parent or guardian, sibling or other immediate family member. 
Moreover, their empirical investigation leads them to conclude that “the business human 
capital acquired from prior work experience in a family member’s business appears to be 
very important for business success.” Less than 2% of small U.S. businesses are 
inherited, according to Fairlie and Robb, consistent with the view that business 
experience rather than business transfer explains the strong intergenerational link in 
business ownership propensities.  
Third, the nature of work experience, one’s own and that of friends and family, 
probably plays an important role in shaping attitudes towards business regulation, 
taxation, public sector employment, and income redistribution. There is a greater belief in 
the propositions that “poverty is society’s fault” and “luck determines income” in 
countries with higher social welfare spending (Alesina and Glaeser, chapter 7). And there 
is stronger support for the view that “it is the responsibility of the government to reduce 
income differences” in countries with a history of socialized production (Corneo and 
Gruener, 2002, Table 1).  These cross-country patterns suggest that limited work 
experience in free enterprise activity leads to limited political support for economic 
reforms that would aggressively expand private business activity and employment.  
Despite Puerto Rico’s huge shortfall in overall employment rates, the percentage of 
adults who work in the public sector was actually larger on the island than on the 
mainland in 1980 and 1990. For example, 13.2% of adult Puerto Ricans worked in the 
                                                 
7 Recent studies on this issue include Dunn and Holtz-Eakin (2000), Hout and Rosen (2000), and Fairlie 
and Robb (2003).   8 
public sector in 1990, compared to 11.6% of U.S. adults. The situation reversed over the 
next decade as public sector employment rates in Puerto Rico fell sharply to 9.3% of the 
adult population in 2000. Part, perhaps a large part, of the decline in Puerto Rico’s public 
sector employment rates reflects the privatization of state-owned enterprises.
8  The partial 
privatization of telecommunications in the 1990s faced strong resistance from labor 
unions that included a long strike and widespread sabotage. It would be useful to know 
how wages and employment fared in privatized Puerto Rican firms before and after 
privatization. It would also be useful to know whether Puerto Ricans who lost public 
sector jobs during the 1990s experienced particular difficulties in finding new jobs in the 
private sector. We are unaware of direct evidence on these issues.    
The public sector continues to absorb a bigger percentage of more educated persons 
on the island, and a much bigger percentage of more educated workers. Consider college-
educated persons in 2000. In Puerto Rico, 24% work in the public sector, 41% work in 
the private sector, and the rest are not employed.  In the United States, 20% work in the 
public sector and 63% work in the private sector. Put differently, the public sector 
absorbs 37% of college-educated workers in Puerto Rico compared to 24% in the United 
States. As shown in Panel C of Table 1, the share of college-educated persons working in 
Puerto Rico’s public sector is even larger, indeed much larger, in 1980 and 1990, and the 
share working in the private sector is smaller. Of course, the population fraction with a 
college education is lower on the island. The upshot is that college-educated persons with 
private-sector work experience are much more abundant in the United States that in 
Puerto Rico. If higher education produces forms of human capital that are useful for 
entrepreneurial endeavors in the private sector, then Puerto Rico faces another type of 
large human capital deficit compared to the United States – larger than a simple 
comparison of schooling levels would suggest.  We attach numbers to this point below. 
 
2.2. Employment Rates by Educational Attainment 
Puerto Rico’s employment shortfall is most acute for less educated persons. Tables 2 
and 3 describe the situation for men and women, respectively, based on household census 
                                                 
8 We have been unable to obtain the data required to quantify the role of privatizations in the decline of 
public sector employment. However, we have been informed that privatized enterprises routinely hired 
government employees, often as a requirement to secure government contracts.    9 
data for 1980, 1990 and 2000. The tables show that U.S. employment rates exceed Puerto 
Rican rates in every schooling category except for college-educated women in 1980. For 
both men and women, there is a clear pattern of bigger gaps in the employment rate at 
lower levels of schooling.  
Less educated persons are also relatively abundant on the island. Hence, in an 
accounting sense, one can attribute a sizable portion of the U.S.-Puerto Rican 
employment gap to lower schooling levels on the island. But the data weigh heavily 
against an explanation for Puerto Rico’s employment shortfall that focuses on lower 
schooling levels as the main reason for lower employment rates. U.S.-Puerto Rican gaps 
in the employment rate are remarkably large within schooling groups. In the 2000 
Census, every schooling group shows a double-digit gap in the employment rate. For 
Puerto Ricans with a high school diploma or GED equivalent (the median schooling level 
among Puerto Rican adults in 2000), the employment rate is 47 percent for men and 25 
percent for women. The corresponding U.S. figures are 75 percent for men and 62 
percent for women. 
Moreover, schooling levels cannot account for the time-series behavior of Puerto 
Rican employment. According to Census data, Puerto Rico’s employment rate fell by 4.8 
percentage points between 1990 and 2000 from an already low base. It fell by 3.6 
percentage points relative to the United States over the same period. These absolute and 
relative declines in Puerto Rico’s employment rate coincide with rising schooling levels 
among Puerto Rican adults and a sharp narrowing of the schooling gap vis-à-vis the 
United States. The labor force survey (Figure 1) presents a more favorable picture of 
Puerto Rico’s employment performance in the 1990s, but even these more favorable data 
suggest that dramatic gains in schooling are associated with very modest increases in the 
rate of employment.  
Tables 2 and 3 also show that the enormous U.S.-Puerto Rican work experience gap 
holds in terms of hours worked as well as employment rates.  For employed men, U.S. 
work time exceeds Puerto Rican work time by 220 to 270 hours per year. This sizable 
gap in hours worked per employed amplifies the work experience gap calculated from 
employment rates. For women, annual work hours per employed person are somewhat 
greater for Puerto Rico in 1980 but somewhat less in 2000. On net, the hours worked data   10 
reinforce and strengthen the view that Puerto Rican residents have accumulated a huge 
shortfall in work experience relative to U.S. residents.  
Table 4 combines data on the population schooling distribution and employment rates 
by schooling levels to calculate the percentage of adults who are college educated and 
working in the private sector. Relative to the population, college-educated persons 
working in the private sector are nearly three times more abundant on the mainland than 
on the island in 1980, and roughly twice as abundant in 1990 and 2000. A similar pattern 
holds with respect to college-educated persons working in the free enterprise segment of 
the economy. Recall from our earlier discussion that we designate the same set of 
industries as comprising the free enterprise segment in Puerto Rico and the United States, 
even though the government role at the industry level looms larger in Puerto Rico. For 
this reason, we think Table 4 understates the relative scarcity of college-educated Puerto 
Ricans engaged in free enterprise work activity.  
 
2.3. The Structure of Public Sector Employment 
Table 5 provides a closer look at public sector employment in Puerto Rico and 
provides additional comparisons to the United States. In 1980, the percentage of workers 
with government jobs was nearly twice as big in Puerto Rico. The public sector share of 
Puerto Rican employment fell from 34 percent in 1980 to 31 percent in 1990 and 25 
percent in 2000. Nevertheless, the public sector continues to account for a much bigger 
fraction of overall employment on the island. The entire gap, and then some, between 
Puerto Rican and U.S. public sector shares reflects bigger employment shares at the sub-
federal government level. In fact, the discrepancy arises almost entirely at the state and 
commonwealth levels of government. The share of total employment accounted for by 
local governments is similar on the island and the mainland.  
Does Puerto Rico’s high public employment share reflect an industry mix that leans 
toward goods and services that, even in the United States, tend to be supplied by the 
public sector? (An industry mix effect.) Or, does Puerto Rico’s high public employment 
share reflect a bigger government role within narrowly defined industries? (A within-
industry effect) To address these questions, express the public sector share of 
employment in Puerto Rico and the United States as   11 
    and  
PR PR PR US US US
i i i i
i i
PUB S PUB PUB S PUB = = ￿ ￿   (1) 
where i S is the share of employment in industry i, and  i PUB  is the public sector share of 
employment for industry i.  Next, evaluate Puerto Rico’s industry-level government 
employment shares at the U.S. industry distribution of employment: 




PUB S PUB =￿   (2) 
Also, evaluate the U.S. industry-level government employment shares at the Puerto Rican 
industry distribution of employment: 




PUB S PUB =￿   (3) 
By calculating (2) and (3), we can quantify the contribution of the industry mix effect and 
the within-industry effect to the U.S.-Puerto Rican difference in the public sector share of 
overall employment. We carry out these calculations using detailed Census classifications 
into 232 to 264 distinct industries, depending on year.  
The results of calculating (2) and (3) appear in the rightmost two columns of 
Panel A in Table 5. The basic story is similar for each Census year: the industry mix 
effect accounts for about 60% of the U.S.-Puerto Rican difference in public sector 
employment shares, and the within-industry effect accounts for about 40%.
9  Recall that 
the U.S.-Puerto Rican gap in the public sector share of overall employment has been 
shrinking. Hence, we infer that Puerto Rico’s economy has been evolving toward a less 
government-intensive industry mix relative to a contemporaneous U.S. benchmark, and at 
the same time, the average U.S.-Puerto Rican gap in public sector employment shares 
within industries has also been shrinking.   
Panel B of Table 5 illustrates the latter point with specific examples. As of 1980, 
Puerto Rico’s public sector share of employment is much larger in several sizable 
industries, involving a broad range of production activities. After 1980, the public sector 
share of employment in these industries shrinks on the island and in the United States. 
The declines in within-industry public sector shares are bigger in absolute percentage 
terms for Puerto Rico. However, the 2000 Census data show that government 
                                                 
9 The decomposition into between and within effects is not exact, but the cross product terms are small in 
these data.   12 
employment continues to play a relatively large role on the island in a broad range of 
industries that include Electric Light and Power, Sugar and Confectionary 
Manufacturing, Residential Care, Nursing Facilities, Child Day Care, Job Training, 
Hospitals, Museums and Zoos, and Sanitary Services. According to these data, there 
remains considerable room for shifting employment and production activity from the 
state sector to the private sector in many Puerto Rican industries.  
 
2.4. The Industry Structure of Employment 
Among the 50 states, there is a close relationship between average years of 
schooling in the adult population and the schooling intensity of the industry mix. In 
particular, the employment mix tilts toward industries that rely more heavily on highly 
educated workers in states with more educated populations. Figure 2 depicts this strong, 
perhaps unsurprising, relationship using household census data. We calculate the state-
level measure of schooling intensity in two steps. In the first step, we compute the 
schooling intensity of each Census industry as the mean years of completed schooling 
among all U.S. workers in the industry, weighting each worker in proportion to hours 
worked.  In the second step, we compute a schooling intensity index for the state (or 
commonwealth) as the employment-weighted mean of the industry-level schooling 
intensity values. By construction, an industry has the same schooling intensity in all 
states and in Puerto Rico. So, the index quantifies the extent to which the employment 
distribution tilts toward schooling-intensive industries. 
Figure 2 reveals a striking misalignment between Puerto Rico’s industry structure 
and the schooling attainment of its population. Mean years of schooling among Puerto 
Rican adults fall well short of any state in each of the last three censuses.
10 Nevertheless, 
the schooling intensity of Puerto Rico’s industry mix exceeds that of two-thirds or more 
of the 50 states.
11 In terms of schooling intensity, Puerto Rico’s industry mix ranks 13th 
out 51 in 1980 (comparable to Virginia, Minnesota, Delaware and Hawaii),  10th out 51 
in 1990  (above Delaware and Vermont), and 16
th  out of 51 in 2000 (tied with Utah and 
                                                 
10 Ladd and Rivera-Batiz (2005) provide a detailed comparison of U.S. and Puerto Rican schooling levels.  
11 Lawrence and Lau (2005) provide complementary evidence that the factor content of Puerto Rican 
exports is out of line with its factor endowment mix. Using industry-level measures of factor intensity, they 
find that Puerto Rican exports are much more capital-intensive than U.S. exports and similar in terms of 
R&D intensity and labor skill intensity, where compensation level proxies for skill.       13 
Washington). Thus the Puerto Rican economy has for decades failed to generate jobs 
that, in terms of educational requirements, fit the qualifications of the Puerto Rican 
population.
12 
This finding provides an important clue regarding Puerto Rico’s anemic 
employment performance and its especially low employment rates among persons with 
lower schooling levels. In an important sense, the “missing jobs” in Puerto Rico are to be 
found largely in labor-intensive industries that rely heavily on less educated workers.  
Table 6 provides additional evidence on this point. Consider Eating, Drinking and 
Lodging, an industry group that accounts for 5 or 6 percent of employment in the United 
States. Most workers in this industry group have relatively low schooling levels.
13 Puerto 
Rico’s share of employment in this industry group is less than any of the 50 states in 
1980 and 1990 and near the bottom of the distribution in 2000. The story is similar but 
less pronounced for Entertainment and Recreation Services. To fully appreciate the 
glaring nature of Puerto Rico’s employment shortfall in these industries, three facts 
should be kept in mind. First, Table 6 considers employment shares, but we showed 
earlier that Puerto Rico’s employment rate is only 55-65% of the U.S. rate. Hence, Puerto 
Rico’s employment shortfall in these industries is much greater as a percentage of the 
working-age population. Second, Puerto Rico has a relative abundance of less educated 
persons to potentially fill jobs in these industries. And third, Puerto Rico is blessed with a 
tropical climate and interesting topography that could potentially attract many more 
visitors from the United States and elsewhere, visitors who would intensively demand the 
types of goods and services that these industries produce.  In light of these last two 
points, the magnitude of Puerto Rico’s employment shortfall in these industries is a 
                                                 
12 A small caveat to this conclusion is worth a mention. The same economic policies that distort Puerto 
Rico’s industry structure may also alter the mix of production activities within industries on the island 
relative to the mainland. In the case of Pharmaceuticals, Section 936 tax subsidies stimulated the sourcing 
of physical production to the island while the more schooling-intensive research and development activities 
remained on the mainland. For two reasons, we do not see this issue as a big concern in the interpretation of 
Figure 2. First, the scope for this type of outsourcing arises mainly in certain manufacturing industries.  
Second, the Section 936 subsidies are highly concentrated in a small number of capital-intensive industries 
that account for only a small share of employment. Pharmaceutical manufacturers, which received the bulk 
of Section 936 subsidies, account for only 2-3 percent of Puerto Rican employment in recent decades.   
13 Table A.2 in Davis and Henrekson (2005b) reports workers’ mean schooling years for 61 industry groups 
based on data from the Current Population Survey for 1984 to 196.  Eating and Drinking establishments 
rank 54 out of 61 industry groups on this measure of skill, and Hotels and Lodging rank 47.     14 
powerful testament to the decades-long failure of industrial and employment policy on 
the island.   
One might hope that Puerto Rico’s rising schooling levels would eventually 
eliminate any employment shortfall created by the misalignment of its industry structure. 
However, Figure 3 suggests that such a hope is largely in vain. We carry out the same 
type of exercise as before in Figure 3, except that we now relate the industry structure of 
employment to the schooling attainment of employed, rather than all, persons.  For 1980 
and 1990, Figure 3 tells a similar story to Figure 2. By 2000, however, the misalignment 
between the schooling intensity of Puerto Rico’s industry structure and the schooling 
attainment of its workers has largely vanished. Puerto Rico remains an outlier in 2000 but 
no more so than Texas, California or New Mexico. Yet, as we have seen, the U.S.-Puerto 
Rican gap in the employment-population ratio remains enormous in 2000. In other words, 
Puerto Rico achieved a reasonable alignment between its industry structure and the 
educational attainment of its workers by 2000 – roughly in line with the relationship 
among the 50 states – but it did so by excluding the less educated from jobs. 
One other fact, readily visible in Figure 1, belies the hope that Puerto Rico can 
educate its way out of a huge jobs shortage for less educated persons.  Between 1980 and 
2000, the U.S.-Puerto Rican gap in average schooling attainment among persons 16-65 
years old shrank by roughly two thirds.  Yet over the same twenty-year period, the Puerto 
Rican employment rate rose only slightly from 61% to 64% of the U.S. rate according to 
the labor force survey, and it fell relative to the U.S. rate according to the household 
census.  If more education were the key to addressing Puerto Rico’s employment 
shortfall, the island would have a spectacular record of employment growth in recent 
decades.    
 
2.5. The Size and Ownership Structure of Employment 
Table 7 reports the distribution of paid employees by establishment size in four major 
industry groups for Puerto Rico and the United States.
14  These statistics derive from the 
Economic Census of 1997, an establishment-level census of all tax-paying business units 
                                                 
14 Comparable statistics on the distribution of employees by firm size are not available for Puerto Rico in 
the Economic Census or other sources known to us.   15 
in covered sectors. In comparison to the United States, Puerto Rico’s Construction and 
Manufacturing employees are considerably more concentrated at larger establishments. In 
contrast, its Retail Trade employees are dramatically less concentrated at larger 
establishments. Remarkably, only 36% of retail employees in Puerto Rico work at 
establishments with fifty or more paid employees, as compared to 76% on the U.S. 
mainland. The two employee size distributions are similar in Wholesale Trade, although 
Puerto Rico has smaller shares at the smallest and largest establishments. In short, there is 
no simple characterization of Puerto Rico’s small business employment share, relative to 
the United States, that holds across major industry groups. 
The Economic Census also provides limited information about the ownership 
structure of employment. As seen in Table 8, unincorporated enterprises account for very 
small shares of paid employees in Manufacturing. They account for bigger shares, 
ranging from 5% to 24%, in Construction, Wholesale Trade and Retail Trade. Notably, 
the share of paid employees at unincorporated enterprises in these industry groups is 
roughly twice as big in Puerto Rico as on the U.S. mainland. Retail Trade again presents 
a sharp contrast: about 16% of paid employees work for individual proprietorships in 
Puerto Rico, compared to only 6% on the U.S. mainland.  
The Retail Trade figures for Puerto Rico are especially noteworthy in light of 
developments on the U.S. mainland in recent decades. Wal-Mart, Target, Staples, Best 
Buy, Home Depot and other national chains have propelled the introduction and diffusion 
of larger stores with greater product selection, lower prices, electronic credit-card 
processing, barcode scanners, and advanced inventory management techniques.
15 In the 
process, they have transformed the U.S. retail sector, dramatically increasing 
productivity, and displacing thousands of smaller and independent retail enterprises. 
Using micro data from the U.S. Census of Retail Trade, Foster et al. (2004) document 
that retail establishments owned by large national chains have higher labor productivity 
than establishments owned by single-unit firms. They also show that essentially all of the 
productivity growth in the U.S. retail sector between 1987 and 1997 reflects the 
                                                 
15 For description and analysis of these developments in the U.S. Retail Trade sector, see Nakamura (1999), 
McKinsey Global Institute (2001), Sieling, Friedman and Dumas (2001), Foster, Haltiwanger and Krizan 
(2004), Hausman and Leibtag (2004), Basker (2005ab), and Holmes (2005).     16 
displacement of less productive single-establishment retail firms by the entry of more 
productive, typically larger, establishments owned by national chains.   
Wal-Mart, in particular, has been at the forefront of these developments and has 
attracted attention in several careful studies. McKinsey Global Institute (2001) describes 
Wal-Mart’s role in the transformation of the retail sector this way:  
In general merchandise retailing, productivity growth accelerated after 
1995 because Wal-Mart’s success forced competitors to improve their 
operations. In 1987, Wal-Mart had just 9 percent market share, but was 
40 percent more productive than its competitors. By the mid-1990s, its 
share  had  grown  to  27  percent  while  its  productivity  advantage 
widened to 48 percent. Competitors reacted by adopting many of Wal-
Mart’s  innovations,  including  large  scale  (“big  box”)  format, 
economies of scale in warehouse logistics and purchasing, electronic 
data interchange (EDI), and wireless barcode scanning.  
 
Tables 7 and 8 imply that Puerto Rico’s retail sector lags well behind the mainland in 
the type of creative destruction process documented by Foster et al. (2004) and McKinsey 
Global Institute – to the detriment of its residents. Some of the most powerful consumer 
benefits of the U.S. retail transformation take the form of lower prices. Hausman and 
Leibtag (2004) find that “Wal-Mart offers identical food items at an average price about 
15%-25% lower than traditional supermarkets.” A complementary study by Basker 
(2005b) finds that the entry of a new Wal-Mart store leads to significantly lower prices at 
competitor stores in the same city.  Basker (2005a) provides evidence that the entry of a 
new Wal-Mart store leads to a modest net increase in county-wide employment.   
Why has Puerto Rico lagged in the transformation of its retail sector? The permitting 
process for new construction and real estate development projects has slowed the 
transformation of the retail sector for reasons explained in Section 4 below.  Municipal 
government oversight of retail store entry and location decisions has also played a role, as 
explained in Section 3.4 below. 
 
2.6. Informal Sector Employment 
The underground, shadow or informal economy refers to output and incomes 
generated in market production activity that are not declared to the government, 
particularly the tax and regulatory authorities. Standard establishment-based measures of   17 
output and employment are unlikely to capture underground activity.  In principle, 
household surveys capture employment in the underground economy, but respondents 
may be reluctant to provide information about employment in illegal or undeclared 
activities. This leaves open the possibility that official estimates of Puerto Rico’s 
employment rate are so low, because they miss a high rate of employment in the 
underground economy.  
Estudios Técnicos (2004) provides a figure for informal sector employment in 
Puerto Rico that is 20.5 percent as large as the official labor force measure.  However, the 
figure is based on a methodology that attributes the U.S.-Puerto Rican gap in labor force 
participation rates to the U.S.-Puerto Rican gap in informal sector employment. So the 
20.5% figure is essentially a restatement of the participation (and employment) gap, and 
it cannot tell us how much of the measured employment gap reflects informal sector 
activity.  Direct, survey-based evidence on informal sector employment for a random 
sample of Puerto Rican residents is lacking. The lack of direct evidence leaves us unable 
to confidently adjust the U.S.-Puerto Rican employment gap for informal activity.  
It is unlikely, however, that the informal sector accounts for the bulk of the U.S.-
Puerto Rican employment gap, as measured by standard labor force surveys. Many 
persons who work off the books for a portion of their income also hold formal sector 
jobs, and they already show up in measured employment. Many other persons who work 
only in the informal sector are also counted as employed in household surveys.  Hence, 
any U.S.-Puerto Rican gap in the rate of missing employment is smaller in magnitude, 
probably much smaller, than the U.S.-Puerto Rican difference in informal sector 
employment rates. In addition, the available evidence suggests that underground activity 





                                                 
16 Bosworth and Collins (2005, Appendix B) report that the revenue gap between income in the national 
accounts and income declared for tax purposes diminished sharply after 1976 in Puerto Rico. This trend 
suggests that underground activity motivated by tax avoidance activity also declined.  In recent years 
Puerto Rico’s revenue gap as a percentage of GDP has declined to levels only a few percentage points 
above the U.S. level. Another standard indicator based on electricity usage suggests that underground 
activity in Puerto Rico fell sharply relative to GDP in the 1980s, and then partly recovered in the 1990s.   18 
3. Policy Influences on Business Development and Employment Growth 
3.1. The overall policy and institutional environment  
Compared to many middle-income countries, Puerto Rico enjoys strong 
institutions and favorable economic policies. By virtue of its association with the United 
States, Puerto Rico benefits from sound monetary policy, a stable financial environment, 
and open migration to and from the U.S. mainland.  Puerto Rico’s international trade 
regime is largely governed by U.S. trade policies and World Trade Organization (WTO) 
rules. As a result, tariffs on traded goods and services are relatively low and somewhat 
insulated from manipulation by political authorities on the island. Price controls are 
minimal, and there are no burdensome currency regulations or capital controls. Many 
aspects of the overall economic environment are shaped by U.S. laws.  
Set against these favorable features of Puerto Rico’s economic environment are 
several unfavorable ones. There are peculiarities and loopholes in the application of U.S. 
trade laws that raise effective trade barriers. Section 936 and other tax subsidies have 
distorted Puerto Rico’s industrial structure. Minimum wage laws raise the cost of 
employing less skilled workers. An extensive role for government transfer payments 
undermines work incentives. An inefficient and cumbersome regime for business licenses 
and permits impedes construction activity, new business development and cost-effective 
operation of existing businesses. More generally, many government services are of poor 
quality, and there is a culture of dependence on the government as a source of 
employment and favors. In addition, the traditional prevalence of state-owned enterprises 
has probably softened competitive pressures and lowered productivity throughout much 
of the economy. We discuss each of these features in greater detail below. 
Table 9 shows business climate indicators compiled by the World Bank for Puerto 
Rico and other countries.  According to these indicators, Puerto Rico compares favorably 
to the Latin American and Caribbean region in terms of the costs of starting a formal 
business, the regulation of employment, institutional support for credit markets, and the 
costs of closing an insolvent business. The Puerto Rican business climate is roughly 
comparable to the average OECD country according to many of the indicators, and there 
is greater employment flexibility on the island. The most unfavorable aspects of Puerto   19 
Rico’s business climate according to the World Bank indicators pertain to the cost and 
difficulty of enforcing commercial debt obligations.   
The picture of Puerto Rico’s business climate suggested by Table 9 is too rosy in 
our view, because it fails to capture several factors that increase day-to-day operating 
costs, raise artificial barriers to entry and expansion, and cultivate a rent-seeking business 
culture.  Unfortunately, these factors are difficult to quantify. Hence, portions of our 
discussion below rely on descriptive and anecdotal evidence drawn from a variety of 
sources, including informal interviews with business persons and government officials. 
 
3.2. Trade Protectionism 
  The U.S. Jones Act raises the cost of trade between Puerto Rico and the United 
States by requiring the use of American vessels for all goods shipped by sea between 
Puerto Rican and U.S. ports. The effect is equivalent to a tariff on Puerto Rican imports 
from the United States and on U.S. imports from Puerto Rico.   
Puerto Rico has also established protectionist measures that are incompatible with 
WTO rules for international trade. For instance, Law 69 of 2002 levies a higher excise 
tax for high-volume producers than for low-volume producers. High-volume producers 
tend to be foreign, and low-volume producers tend to be local. The Supreme Court of 
Puerto Rico has ruled that Law 69 does not discriminate against foreign producers, 
because it does not explicitly target foreign firms for higher tax rates.
17 In recent cases 
involving Japan, Korea and Chile, however, the WTO has ruled that what matters is the 
outcome, not the precise manner in which local authorities structure a tax (Rodriguez 
Santiago, 2005).  
Puerto Rico also has other “buy local” laws with a strong protectionist element. 
These laws support certain local enterprises, but they also distort purchase decisions, 
lessen competitive pressures, and lower government tax revenues. For example, Law 110 
(August 2001) provides for a 25% credit on Puerto Rican corporate income taxes for the 
purchase of eligible products manufactured and sold in Puerto Rico. Law 169 (December 
2001) contains similar provisions for manufactured goods that are purchased for export. 
                                                 
17 U.S. federal courts did not assume jurisdiction in this matter, leaving it to Puerto Rican courts.   20 
A June 2005 executive order issued by the governor requires government agencies to 
earmark 15 percent of their purchase contracts for small and mid-sized local enterprises.  
 
3.3. Tax Subsidies that Distort the Structure of Production and Employment 
Tax incentives for industry have a long history in Puerto Rico. Section 936 of the 
U.S. tax code “largely exempted U.S. corporations from paying federal tax on income 
earned by their Puerto Rican subsidiaries. Puerto Rico has a parallel tax subsidy program 
effectively exempting 936 corporations from Puerto Rican income taxes as well.”
18  
(Hexner and Jenkins, 1998)  At one time, these tax subsidies were seen as useful tools for 
stimulating employment in labor-intensive industries and easing Puerto Rico’s 
unemployment problems. In practice, Section 936 tax subsidies proved most attractive in 
capital-intensive manufacturing industries that produce proprietary products with big 
price markups over marginal costs. Products of this type facilitate tax-minimizing transfer 
prices and profit shifting between jurisdictions with different effective tax rates.      
According to a study by the U.S. General Accounting Office (1993) cited in 
Bosworth and Collins (2005), Section 936 tax subsidies to U.S. corporations with Puerto 
Rican operations amounted to $2.6 billion in 1989 or 13% of Puerto Rico’s GDP. One 
view is that subsidies of this magnitude profoundly influenced Puerto Rico’s economy 
and industrial structure. Another view is that the Section 936 subsidies mainly reflect 
paper transactions with little impact on the Puerto Rican economy but a high cost to the 
U.S. treasury. Both views contain an important element of truth. On the one hand, 
Bosworth and Collins make a convincing case that a large portion of the Section 936 
subsidies in recent decades reflects income shifting by U.S. corporations through 
distorted transfer prices and other means.  On the other hand, it is widely acknowledged 
that pharmaceutical firms sourced much of their production activity in Puerto Rico to 
exploit Section 936 subsidies. The employment statistics for Pharmaceuticals in Table 6 
support this view. The share of employment accounted for by the Pharmaceuticals 
                                                 
18 Section 936 was established by the U.S. Tax Act of 1976, but precursors in the U.S. and Puerto Rican tax 
codes date back several decades. Section 936 tax credits have been phased out as of 2005, but U.S. firms 
can still defer U.S. corporate income tax on Puerto Rican earnings by converting their Puerto Rican 
operations into controlled foreign corporations.  See Odishelidze and Laffer (2004, pages 174-180) for a 
useful synopsis of the evolution of Section 936 and related features of the U.S. and Puerto Rican tax codes. 
Pelzman (2002) provides a detailed and highly informative description.     21 
industry in Puerto Rico is about ten times larger than in the United States as a whole and 
two or three times larger than in any single state.   
If the goal is to stimulate employment, one would be hard pressed to devise a less 
effective, more costly tool than Section 936 subsidies or similar tax subsidies. Hunter 
(2003, Figure 4) reports that, in 1993, 98.5% of Section 936 tax credits for the Puerto 
Rican operations of U.S. corporations accrue to Manufacturing and Public Utilities. 
These are among the most capital-intensive sectors of the economy. According to 
Bosworth and Collins, 60% of the subsidies accrue to the manufacture of chemicals and 
allied products such as medicines. Hexner and Jenkins (1998) refer to a 1992 GAO study 
that finds “drug companies with manufacturing operations in Puerto Rico received tax 
benefits worth $72,788 for each job paying an average of $26,471.” 
 
3.4. Tax Subsidies, Entry Barriers, and Rent-Seeking Behavior 
Section 936 tax subsidies merit special attention because of their enormous 
magnitude, historically, and their impact on the structure of employment and output. But 
they are only part of a larger story. The Puerto Rican tax code and regulatory system 
abound with provisions that cater to special business interests. Some provisions take the 
form of targeted tax breaks, others restrict business entry and expansion, and others 
involve licensing requirements and burdensome regulations that favor incumbents over 
potential rivals.  In this climate, profitability and survival often hinge on obtaining and 
exploiting special tax breaks and regulatory advantages. The result is a complicated web 
of policy-induced financial incentives that helps to sustain a rent-seeking business culture 
and an overly intrusive role for the government. 
As an illustration, Table 10 presents a list of business incentives enacted into law 
from August 2001 to August 2002.
19 Various provisions aim to encourage the industrial, 
agricultural and export sectors, the film industry, call center operations, stagnant 
municipalities, and the employment of high skill workers and handicapped workers. 
These various provisions, which add to a large set of older incentive programs, exhibit 
                                                 
19 The number of industrial incentives enacted into law during this period is unusually large, but the 
characteristics of the incentives described in Table 10 are typical of other periods as well. We do not claim 
that the list in Table 10 is exhaustive for the period covered.  See Cao Garcia (2004) for an historical 
account of federal and home-grown tax incentives in Puerto Rico, and Alm and Cao Garcia (2005) for a 
comparative analysis of Puerto Rico’s tax system.   22 
several noteworthy characteristics. First, they typically benefit special business interests. 
Second, the form of the benefits, e.g., credits and deductions on business taxes, makes it 
difficult to assess the magnitude of the subsidy and the likely drain on the government 
treasury.  Third, the incentive provisions often enlarge the powers of the government 
bureaucracy, especially at the commonwealth level. Fourth, several of the industrial 
incentives erode the revenue base at the municipal level. Examples include exemptions 
from local property taxes and municipal patent requirements. Fifth, some provisions 
contain an element of trade protectionism, such as tax exemptions for the purchase of 
Puerto Rican manufactures. Finally, when taken as a whole, Table 10 suggests that rent 
seeking is an important feature of the Puerto Rican business climate. Much effort and 
large expenditures are devoted to lobbying the legislature for special-interest provisions. 
The bills actually passed into law represent a small sample of the proposals that shuttle 
around the legislature. 
Rent seeking behavior extends beyond tax breaks and subsidized credit to a 
variety of entry barriers that protect incumbents and local business interests. Some of the 
most important barriers arise at the municipal government level. Businesses in Puerto 
Rico must usually obtain a patent from the local municipality to operate within its 
boundaries. The steps required for obtaining municipal patents look straightforward on 
the books, but, in practice, the process can be plagued with difficulties. A key problem is 
that a patent is granted only for a particular location, as determined by the municipal 
authority. Municipalities often grant patents only for slow business areas, effectively 
protecting incumbents in desirable locations. 
Other entry barriers arise at the commonwealth level. A recent federal appeals 
court decision explains how entry barriers work for retail pharmacies in Puerto Rico.
20  
Law No. 189 of July 29, 1979 requires a proposed new pharmacy establishment to obtain 
a Certificate of Need and Convenience from the Secretary of the Puerto Rico Health 
Department. Certificates are routinely granted in the absence of local merchant 
opposition, but they are subjected to a costly and lengthy legal proceeding if any 
“affected party”, invariably a rival pharmacy establishment, opposes the proposed 
pharmacy.  In such cases, the certificate is often denied, as it was for several Walgreen 
                                                 
20 See United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit (2005b).   23 
outlets. Walgreen filed suit in federal court, claiming that Law 189 amounted to an 
unconstitutional infringement on interstate commerce, and eventually prevailed at the 
appellate level. The Walgreen matter pertained to pharmacies only, and similar 
certification requirements remain in effect for other health care facilities.  
More generally, licensing requirements restrict entry into many professions, 
services and business activities. In the past decade, there has been a wave of lobbying 
efforts to establish new professional licensing requirements and collegiate associations 
with compulsory dues.  One example involves the legal requirements to produce a public 
performance such as a theatrical production or a music concert. The current requirements 
under Law 182 are reasonably straightforward: a $20 license fee, a certificate of good 
conduct, evidence that tax payments are current, and the posting of a bond or insurance 
policy. Law 182 also provides for a $10,000 fine for anyone who produces an event 
without a license. House bill 1460, approved by the House with bipartisan support on 
June 21, 2005, would raise entry barriers by requiring that a producer have five years of 
experience as a promoter, work at least one year with an established producer, and hold a 
specified college degree. In addition, the proposed law would create a Puerto Rico 
College of Public Performance Producers (Colegio de Productores de Espectáculos 
Públicos) that would have the power to license, regulate, sue, and investigate the actions 
of collegiate members. Similar legislation is currently under review in the Senate.  Other 
recent examples of efforts to erect professional entry barriers include Senate Project 1842 
for psychologists, a proposed College of Journalists for newspersons, and House Project 
3755 for economists. This last one is favored by the Puerto Rico Association of 
Economists, suggesting that economists are just as ready to erect entry barriers in their 
own interests as anyone else. 
The similarity of these licensing requirements and collegiate organizations to 
medieval guilds is striking. These measures are sold as arrangements that ensure quality 
and protect local interests against foreign interests or large companies. Their clear 
economic effect, however, is to restrict competition and raise prices for consumers. Adam 
Smith developed this theme more than two centuries ago in his vigorous critique of 
mandatory apprenticeships and other restrictions on entry into cutlery, weaving and other   24 
trades in 18
th century Britain.
21 More recently, Djankov et al. (2001) examine data for 
start-up firms in 85 countries. They report that countries with heavier entry regulation 
have more corruption and larger underground economies but not better quality of private 
or public goods.  The implication is that stronger entry regulation accentuates corruption 
and expands the underground economy without any compensating improvement in the 
quality of goods and services. 
 
3.5. Taxes on Labor Income and Consumption 
Taxes on labor income and consumption expenditures encourage households to 
substitute away from the legal market sector in favor of untaxed activities – leisure, 
household production, and the underground economy. Substitution away from the legal 
market sector is relatively easy for certain goods and services such as meal preparation 
and cleaning services, and relatively difficult for others such as automobile production 
and surgery. Hence, high tax rates on labor and consumption discourage work activity in 
the legal market sector, and they systematically alter the mix of market production 
activity. Tax-sensitive sectors include eating and drinking establishments, laundry and 
cleaning services, child care, consumer repair services, domestic household help, and 
most personal services. As suggested by this list of examples, tax-sensitive sectors tend to 
rely heavily on workers with lower schooling and lower wages. It follows that high tax 
rates on labor and consumption have disproportionately large negative effects on the 
demand for less skilled workers. 
Davis and Henrekson (2005a) investigate these issues in a sample of rich 
countries. They find that higher tax rates on labor and consumption lead to less work 
activity in the legal market sector, a bigger underground economy, and an altered 
industry mix.
22 The estimated effects are quite large. Consider, for example, a 12.8 
percentage point between-country difference in the tax rate, a unit standard deviation in 
the cross section of their sample. Using data for the mid-1990s and their preferred 
specification, they find that a tax rate increase of this size leads to 122 fewer hours 
                                                 
21 See Book I, chapter X, part II in The Wealth of Nations. See Carlton and Perloff (2000, pages 74-76) for 
a modern analysis of the adverse price, output and cost effects of artificial entry restrictions. 
22 Many other studies also investigate the role of tax rates in cross-country differences in work activity and 
the size of the underground economy. See Davis and Henrekson (2005a) for references to this literature.   25 
worked per adult per year in the legal market sector, a drop of 4.9 percentage points in 
the employment-population ratio, and a rise in the underground economy equal to 3.8% 
of GDP. It also lowers by 10 to 30 percent the economy-wide share of production and 
employment in tax-sensitive sectors such as eating, drinking and lodging establishments. 
As Davis and Henrekson stress, these estimates reflect the direct effect of taxes on labor 
supply and labor demand plus the effects of tax-funded welfare and social insurance 
programs on labor supply incentives. 
The impact of tax-funded transfer programs is of particular concern in Puerto 
Rico, because so many residents rely on government transfers as a major source of 
income. As analyzed in detail by Burtless and Sotomayor (2005) and Enchautegui and 
Freeman.(2005), these transfer programs often confront recipients with very high implicit 
tax rates if they move from welfare to work. On the U.S. mainland, earned income tax 
credits for working families mitigate the adverse labor supply incentives introduced by 
means-tested transfer programs. Puerto Rican residents are not eligible for earned income 
tax credits, because they do not pay federal income taxes.   
 
3.6 Minimum wage laws 
The U.S. Federal Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) regulates minimum wages 
and working conditions for covered workers. It has applied to Puerto Rico since its 
inception in 1938, but for decades the FSLA allowed for less extensive coverage and 
lower minimum wages in Puerto Rico. Starting in 1974, amendments to the FLSA 
increased coverage in Puerto Rico and gradually brought the Federal minimum for Puerto 
Rico into line with the U.S. minimum. Since 1983 Puerto Rican employers have faced 
essentially the same minimum wage requirements as U.S. employers (Castillo-Freeman 
and Freeman, 1992).  The current Federal minimum of $5.15 per hour for covered 
workers is about 30% of the average hourly wage in the United States and more than 60% 
of the average hourly wage in Puerto Rico.
23 The Federal minimum has also been quite 
high historically relative to the average wage in Puerto Rico.  
                                                 
23 Puerto Rico’s average hourly wage is about $8.00. Table 620 in U.S. Bureau of the Census (2005) reports 
an average hourly wage of $17.35 for the United States in 2002.    26 
There is compelling evidence that minimum wage laws have profoundly affected 
the earnings distribution in Puerto Rico.
24 For example, Castillo-Freeman and Freeman 
(1992) report that half of all covered workers in 1979 were paid at the prevailing U.S. 
minimum of $2.90 per hour and another 13% were paid within 10 cents of the U.S. 
minimum.  They also show that the increase in the Federal minimum from $2.90 in 1979 
to $3.35 in 1983 had a pronounced effect on the shape of the earnings distribution.  
The evidence regarding employment effects is much less clear cut. Based on an 
investigation of aggregate and industry-level data, Castillo-Freeman and Freeman 
conclude that the extension of the U.S. minimum to the island starting in 1974 caused 
“massive job losses” and greatly altered Puerto Rico’s industry mix.
25  However, Krueger 
(1995) revisits the same data and concludes that the evidence regarding employment 
effects is “fragile” and “surprisingly weak.” He shows that the estimated employment 
effects of Castillo-Freeman and Freeman are sensitive to reasonable alternatives for the 
empirical specifications and estimation methods. In short, the existing literature has 
reached no clear conclusions about the employment effects of minimum wage 
requirements in Puerto Rico. 
Previous studies are largely silent about the longer term employment 
consequences of minimum wage requirements. This is a major drawback for the purposes 
of policy analysis, because the disemployment effects of minimum wage requirements 
are probably (much) larger in the longer term.  It takes time to substitute away from low 
skill labor in response to mandatory wage floors. These substitution responses can take 
the form of higher capital-labor ratios, greater reliance on relatively skilled workers, and 
the adoption of labor-saving technology. Even with fixed factor intensities and 
unchanging technologies, disemployment effects mount over time if minimum wage 
requirements operate on the entry margin for new employers and new job positions. 
Given the overwhelming evidence that minimum wage laws have pushed up the lower 
half of Puerto Rico’s wage distribution, it is highly likely that they also slowed the entry 
of new employers and the creation of new jobs for less skilled workers. In this regard, the 
evidence in Figure 2 is highly suggestive: Puerto Rico’s missing jobs are concentrated in 
                                                 
24 See Reynolds and Gregory (1965), Santiago (1989) and Castillo-Freeman and Freeman (1992).  
25 Santiago (1989) reaches similar conclusions based on a different approach to the aggregate time series.   27 
industries with relatively low schooling requirements. Employment in these industries is 
much more likely to be depressed by minimum wage requirements than employment in 
schooling-intensive industries.  
Slow-working disemployment effects also arise through the impact of minimum 
wage requirements on the accumulation of work-related skills, as analyzed by Hashimoto 
(1982) and Mincer (1984), among many others. The skill accumulation effects work 
through two main channels. First, wage floors can reduce employment and hours directly, 
lowering work experience. Second, even when there is no direct effect on employment 
and hours, a binding wage minimum reduces the scope for learning and training on the 
job. For both reasons, workers then accumulate marketable skills more slowly. The result 
is a reduction in future earnings capacity and weaker attachment to the labor market, as 
recently emphasized by Neumark and Nizalova (2004).
26 Longer term effects on labor 
market attachment are of particular concern when means-tested government transfer 
payments prop up reservation wages, as they do in Puerto Rico for a large fraction of the 
population. In summary, there are good reasons to think that the application of U.S.-level 
minimum wages has had a large negative impact on the rate of employment in Puerto 
Rico and on the accumulation of marketable skills among Puerto Rican residents. 
 
3.7 Other labor market regulations 
Private business owners and public sector managers in Puerto Rico frequently 
complain about an inability to address worker abuse of labor market regulations. There 
are important abuses pertaining to vacation time, sick leave, and worker dismissal. For 
example, employee claims of work-related stress are routinely endorsed by medical 
authorities without serious examination. As another example, the law mandates twelve 
days of sick leave per year for employees. However, employees are required to submit a 
medical report only if absent from work for more than two consecutive days.  Many 
workers abuse the system by claiming health-related absences two days at a time up to 
                                                 
26 Previous research provides little direct evidence on the longer term effects of minimum wage 
requirements, but the work by Neumark and Nizalova (2004) is an exception. They present evidence that 
exposure to higher minimum wage requirements at young ages leads to lower earnings and fewer work 
hours later in life for U.S. residents.  The estimated effects are sizable: one additional year of exposure as a 
teenager to an 11 percent increase in the minimum wage above the level of the Federal minimum lowers 
earnings by 1.9% at ages 25-29. Reduced hours at ages 25-29 account for about one-quarter of the earnings 
reduction.   28 
the maximum number of days per year. Health-related absences are not determined in 
advance, so business planning and the performance of work groups suffer from 
unscheduled absences. These unscheduled absences raise labor costs and discourage 
employment growth.  
Other problems arise in connection with dismissals and long term leaves of 
absence. If an employee is granted a long term leave for health-related reasons, the rules 
of the State Security Fund (Fondo de Seguro del Estado, FSE) require the employer to 
keep the employee’s post open for a full year. During that time, the employer need not 
pay wages but must pay social benefits. The rules also specify that the employer cannot 
phone the employee or the FSE to discuss the issue. As a result, it is difficult for the firm 
to plan and operate efficiently.  Worker dismissal often ends in legal lawsuits, causing 
employers to refrain from legally justifiable dismissals due to incompetence at work or a 
business slowdown. In turn, the difficulty and cost of dismissing workers make 
employers reluctant to hire.  
 
3.8 The Effect of State-Owned Enterprises on the Competitive Environment 
As we documented in Section 2, the public sector accounts for a large but declining 
share of economic activity in Puerto Rico. This evidence raises two questions: 
Historically, how has a large public sector affected the competitive environment in Puerto 
Rico? And, how is Puerto Rico’s competitive environment likely to evolve in response to 
a declining role for the public sector? Definitive answers to these questions are beyond 
the scope of this paper, but we can draw on recent research to suggest some tentative 
answers. In this regard, our main point is twofold: a large role for the public sector 
lessens competitive pressures, and a lessening of competitive pressures yields lower 
productivity.  
A large public sector lessens competitive pressures in the economy for several 
reasons. First, state-owned enterprises operate with “softer” budget constraints than 
private enterprises in the sense that financial distress is more likely to result in taxpayer-
funded bailouts for public enterprises. Second, the private sector can rely on the profit 
motive and high-powered incentives much more readily and effectively than the public 
sector. Third, when public and private sector enterprises potentially compete in the same   29 
line of business, the state often restricts private sector entry or expansion opportunities in 
order to protect the public enterprise. The U.S. postal service – with its government-
granted monopoly in the delivery of first-class mail – is a classic example. 
Several recent studies provide evidence that greater competitive pressure leads to 
higher labor productivity. This research suggests that the beneficial productivity effects 
of competitive pressure work through a variety of channels that vary with circumstances. 
Galdon-Sanchez and Schmitz (2002) and Schmitz (2005) offer some of the most 
compelling evidence that competitive pressure can provide the impetus for dramatic 
productivity gains. Schmitz (2005) finds that an intensification of competitive pressure in 
the iron ore industry in the early 1980s led, within a few years, to a doubling of labor 
productivity at U.S. and Canadian mines. Work-rule reforms that cut overstaffing 
requirements in collectively bargained labor contracts drove most of the productivity 
gains. The exit of low-productivity mines and the adoption of new technology played 
minor roles. Schmitz and Teixeira (2004) study the privatization of state-owned iron ore 
mines in Brazil in 1989. Prior to privatization, about 60% of the industry was state 
owned. In the first few years after privatization, labor productivity doubled at newly 
privatized mines and, even more remarkably, previously private mines. These 
productivity gains were much larger than contemporaneous gains at iron ore mines in 
other countries. Several other studies produce evidence that an intensification of 
competitive pressure raises productivity by displacing less efficient producers, triggering 
the reallocation of factor inputs to higher value uses, and stimulating reform in work 
practices.
27 
  These observations suggest that a large public sector has suppressed productivity 
levels in Puerto Rico for decades. By the same logic, they suggest that the rapid 
downsizing of Puerto Rico’s public sector in the 1990s is a potentially important source 




                                                 
27 See Eslaval et al. (2004), Holmes and Schmitz (2001), Markiewicz et al. (2004), Sivadasan (2003), and 
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4. The Permitting Process as a Barrier to Business Development 
4.1. Our Approach to the Topic  
We now turn to the permitting process whereby the government oversees and 
regulates construction and real estate development projects, the commercial use of 
equipment and facilities, and the periodic renewal of various business licenses. To the 
best of our knowledge, there is little systematic research on the permitting process in 
Puerto Rico and no comprehensive sources of information about the process and its 
consequences. Persons with in-depth knowledge of the permitting process are reluctant to 
speak for attribution, because the topic is politically sensitive and because public 
statements could jeopardize their commercial interests. In some cases, concerns about 
potential legal perils may also dissuade statements on the record.  
In light of these realities, we took the following two-pronged approach in our 
efforts to understand the functioning of the permitting process. First, we conducted 
informal interviews with more than one hundred persons who have expertise on or first-
hand experience with the permitting process in Puerto Rico. Second, we sought to 
corroborate the claims and characterizations of interviewees by drawing on external 
public sources such as newspaper articles, judicial proceedings and government laws and 
regulations. The result, we believe, is a first-pass description and analysis that delivers 
some insights into how the permitting process in Puerto Rico raises the cost of doing 
business, corrodes the business and regulatory climate, hampers economic development, 
and undermines the drive for employment growth. Our discussion below focuses on the 
permitting process for construction and real estate development projects, but our 
interviews indicate that the problems we identify also plague the permitting process for 
the commercial use of equipment and facilities and the periodic renewal of business 
operating licenses. 
Before proceeding, a few additional remarks about our interview process are in 
order. We conducted face-to-face interviews with about ten contractors and construction 
engineers, fifteen real estate developers and their employees, ten business persons with 
experience as clients of construction contractors and real estate developers, five lenders 
and employees of financial institutions, twenty current and former government office 
holders, fifteen attorneys and permit specialists, and thirty other persons comprised of   31 
small business owners and their employees, entrepreneurs, and academics with 
knowledge of the permitting process. We did not select the interviewees randomly. 
Instead, we initially approached and interviewed several experts on the permitting 
process, and these experts referred us to other potential interviewees.  As we proceeded, 
we also independently contacted other persons to clarify particular issues or seek out 
additional information. Interviews varied widely in depth and duration. The average 
interview lasted about thirty minutes, but many others lasted no more than ten minutes, 
and several interviews took a few hours. Follow-up interviews to clarify particular 
questions typically took place by phone, and were usually brief. 
 
4.2. Overview of the Permitting Process  
The permitting process for construction and real estate development projects in 
Puerto Rico involves four main elements: 
1.  Consultation regarding the proposed project’s location (consulta de ubicación), 
which requires approval by the Planning Board (Junta de Planificación), an arm of 
the Governor’s office. Zoning variances and proposed exceptions to standard 
construction requirements are also treated at this stage. 
2.  The preparation and filing of environmental assessments and environmental 
impact statements. The latter are more detailed and extensive.  
3.  Applications to the Permits and Regulations Administration (Administración de 
Permisos y Reglamentos, or ARPE) for permits pertaining to construction, 
renovation, and the placement of signs and advertisements. These permits are 
required by law for project development, the construction of new facilities, the 
refashioning of sites when starting new businesses, and for merely putting up 
signs.  
4.  Applications for various use permits required to operate a completed or renovated 
facility. These use permits include health certificates and fire department 
endorsements. 
This high-level overview suggests that the permitting process is reasonably 
straightforward, but the reality is far more complex and fraught with uncertainty, 
compliance costs, and delays. To help provide a sense of the complexity and uncertainty,   32 
Figure 4 (translated from Solá, 2004) depicts the main elements of the permitting process 
as diagrammed by an experienced construction engineer. It offers a bird’s eye view of the 
permitting maze. The sheer number of government agencies with hands in the process 
provides some indication of the complexities and the potential for bottlenecks. Solá 
(2004) describes the process as follows: 
 
There are at least thirty four (34) public agencies that intervene in the 
process, in at least one hundred nineteen (119) procedures and twelve 
(12) stages in obtaining construction permits…There are about sixty 
(60) sets of regulations (reglamentos) that regulate land development 
and construction, many of them, or the amendments to them, realized 
incoherently and without an integrated vision of the objectives of the 
regulation…The  budget  assigned  to  pay  needed  technical  and 
management personnel and to adequately equip regulatory agencies and 
the  reviewing  units  of  the  agencies  providing  endorsements  is 
excessively low. It is therefore necessary to restructure the processes in 
all and each of the agencies simultaneously. Without adequate funding 
these tasks cannot be realized. 
 
All industry participants interviewed for this study stressed that the permitting 
process has been a nightmare for a long time and remains so. Many interviewees 
remarked that construction and development projects must overcome a wide range of 
bureaucratic obstacles that can unexpectedly delay or derail a project in its initial stages, 
and after construction has begun. In the case of environmental reviews, many 
interviewees remarked that bureaucratic inaction, legal ambiguities and political 
uncertainties lead to overly long approval delays and uncertainties.  Interviewees tend to 
agree with the statement that the permitting process requires more than incremental 
change. Instead, the predominant view is that effective reform requires a full scrapping of 
the existing system and a fresh set of rules and procedures. 
 
4.3. Project Approval, Zoning and Construction Variances, and Environmental 
Review  
Two government agencies oversee the regulation of construction and 
development projects: the Planning Board (or Junta) and ARPE. The Planning Board is 
responsible for guiding the island’s overall economic, social and physical development. It   33 
prepares the Economic Report to the Governor and elaborates the government’s fiscal, 
social and economic plans as well as its zoning and other regulations. The agency was 
created in the early 1940s as the brainchild of Governor Rexford Guy Tugwell, who 
made it the main government arm to control and plan development of the island. 
The Planning Board has an explicit consultation role in the permitting process 
when there are requests for variances (variaciones) from existing construction regulations 
and zoning requirements. Variances arise when some aspect of the project does not abide 
exactly by the existing regulations and requirements, which is the case for most 
substantial projects.  Approval of variances requires consultations with the Board as the 
first step in the permitting process. If a project does not involve any variances, the 
developer proceeds directly to ARPE, which oversees the operational process related to 
the granting of permits. ARPE was created in 1975 (Law No. 76 of June 24, 1975) as a 
spin-off from the Planning Board, which formerly undertook the operational functions 
now performed by ARPE. These two agencies now enter at different stages in the 
permitting process and have distinct roles. 
If the Planning Board approves a project’s location and all variances, ARPE takes 
over for the remainder of the process. It applies the regulations, laws, and ordinances that 
govern the use and development of land, the construction, use and alteration of buildings 
and structures, and the installation of signs and announcements (rótulos y anuncios). 
However, if some unapproved variance is detected by ARPE, the developer proposing the 
project must return to the Planning Board for additional consultations and decisions. 
According to interviewees, consultations with the Planning Board typically 
require one to two years for the approval of a major construction or development project, 
and as much as four years. The next step, preliminary approval from ARPE, may take as 
little as one week for projects with no variances from existing regulations and zoning 
requirements, but major projects typically require another six to twelve months for 
approval by ARPE. As mentioned by several developers that we interviewed, 
environmental disputes can further delay the start of development projects for many 
years.  One example is the Serene Coast project in the Piñones area of Loíza, first 
proposed in 1995. The developer originally presented an Environmental Assessment but, 
in response to a judicial proceeding, it submitted a more detailed Environmental Impact   34 
Statement in 1997. As of 2005, the project has yet to obtain Planning Board approval, 
reportedly because public agencies have not determined if the project abides by the 
Environmental Public Policy Law of 1970. In July 2005, the Department of Natural and 
Environmental Resources requested modifications to the project on environmental 
grounds. Opposition to the Serene Coast project by environmental groups set against 
strong support for the project by the mayor of Loíza suggests that a stalemate will 
continue for some time.
28  
 
4.4. Centralization, Politicization and Corruption in the Permitting Process 
Key aspects of the permitting process – location consultation, zoning variances, 
ARPE permits, and environmental approvals – are centralized in the Governor’s office. 
This anomalous state of affairs traces back to the creation of the Planning Board in the 
early 1940’s under the administration of Governor Tugwell, an activist planner. Tugwell 
concentrated the power to grant location and use permits in his office as a planning tool. 
When the Environmental Quality Board was created in 1970, it was incorporated into the 
Governor’s office as well. When the operational part of the permitting process was 
separated from the Planning Board to form ARPE, it was also kept in the Governor’s 
office. Thus, new business activity on the island that requires real estate development, 
new construction or major renovations to existing structures must be approved by the 
Governor’s Office, that is, by agencies operating under the direct supervision of the 
governor. Exceptions for projects in autonomous municipalities are discussed below. 
Perhaps as a result, the regulation of project development and construction 
activities is highly politicized on the island and susceptible to corruption. Experienced 
government workers who are knowledgeable about the consultation and permitting 
process are often transferred to other government offices after a change in administration, 
replaced in turn by less experienced employees affiliated with the winning political party. 
Corruption in the permitting process, and the harm it does to the business climate, came 
up repeatedly in our interviews.  Consistent with comments by interviewees, corruption 
in the permitting process has also received attention in public forums. The president of 
the Retailers’ United Center (Centro Unido de Detallistas) has stated that it is an “open 
                                                 
28 See El Nuevo Día, July 15, 2005, pages 8-9 and July 16, 2005, page 26.   35 
secret” that in the agencies that grant permits, such as ARPE, the Planning Board and the 
Health Department, among others, “money is passed under the table” to obtain the 
permits.
29 In recent years, a number of government officials and employees have been 
convicted in federal court on corruption-related charges in connection with the permitting 
process. Examples include the Deputy Chief of Staff to the Governor in the first half of 
the 1990s and, separately, an executive assistant to the governor in the latter portion of 
the 1990s.  Both accepted regular cash payments from contractors in return for access to 
government officials and expedited permitting. One official’s services also included 
efforts to encourage other government officials to relax construction requirements.
30      
 
4.5. Information Costs in the Permitting Process 
The process for obtaining construction permits and agency endorsements is 
complex and lacking in transparency.  In addition, there is no readily accessible central 
source for the detailed information required to comply with the wide array of regulations. 
These features of the permitting process raise the information costs of compliance, 
increase uncertainty about approval, and add to the potential for unexpected delays and 
bottlenecks. The nature of the bureaucratic regime compounds informational costs and 
related problems by undermining the development of an experienced, apolitical 
workforce in key regulatory agencies. 
Larger developers mitigate informational costs by employing permitting 
specialists.  These in-house specialists are drawn from former government workers at the 
Planning Board or ARPE, engineers who have acquired experience in the permitting 
process, and formerly independent permit specialists or facilitators (gestores). Developers 
also retain independent permit specialists who handle the permitting maze for fees that 
vary according to the specific tasks performed. There is an active market for these 
independent permitting specialists and facilitators, often working in conjunction with law 
and accounting firms.
31 Businesses that lack the scale to efficiently employ an in-house 
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instructive about the business climate surrounding the permitting process and the role of corruption. 
31 As another example of efforts to erect regulatory entry barriers, one segment of this market is currently 
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permit manager, and that are unwilling to pay the fees commanded by independent 
permitting specialists, must fall back on their own efforts to comply with regulations and 
navigate the permitting process. This approach typically involves a great deal of trial and 
error. Several interviewees mentioned the difficulties that confront entrepreneurs and 
employees who attempt to deal with the permitting process without specialized 
assistance.  
Interviewees also pointed out that even permit specialists often make mistakes 
and present inadequate documentation to government agencies. Similarly, some 
interviewees mentioned that a lack of knowledge and professional responsibility on the 
part of some permitting specialists is a problem. Because many specialists obtain their 
initial work experience in only one of the many agencies involved in the permitting 
process, they are not always cognizant of the procedures and rules followed by other 
agencies. 
 
4.6. Coordination Problems and Inefficient Implementation 
Apart from high informational costs, the permitting process is also plagued by 
inefficient implementation on the part of government agencies and the problem of “too 
many cooks”.  Certain stages of the permitting process can require the endorsements of 
up to nineteen agencies. Each endorsing agency has the power to delay or halt the entire 
development project, and this is more likely to occur when the project faces opposition 
on political, commercial or environmental grounds.  Renewal of agency endorsements 
during an ongoing construction project can also be a problem. As a result, developers and 
contractors face substantial uncertainties. The common practice of requiring 
administrative and public hearings regarding permitting issues increases the need to rely 
on attorneys to navigate the process.  
Many interviewees described the government agencies involved in the permitting 
process as inefficient. This segment of the government bureaucracy is faulted for 
excessive complexities, a shortage of personnel and resources, and inadequate employee 
supervision. Communications with ARPE employees require excessive on-site visits for 
                                                                                                                                                 
be allowed to function as permit gestores, i.e., facilitators. Non-engineers who act as facilitators respond 
that they work on permitting issues, not engineering issues.   37 
reasons as mundane as the fact that phone calls often go unanswered. One of us 
experienced the phone problem first hand on many occasions. On one occasion, several 
efforts to contact ARPE by phone resulted in two calls that were answered and referrals 
to several extension numbers of engineers who evaluate projects. However, none of these 
extensions yielded a response and the effort to acquire information ended unsuccessfully 
after half an hour of frustration. Similar communication problems were mentioned by 
interviewees, who noted that it is often more efficient to obtain information in person at 
the agency rather than by phone or from agency web pages.  
 
4.7. Autonomous Municipalities 
The Autonomous Municipalities Law (Law No. 81 of August 30, 1991) allows a 
municipality to bypass the Planning Board and ARPE for construction and development 
projects confined to its boundaries. To do so, the municipality must meet certain financial 
standards, be able to manage its own accounting system, have an approved territorial 
organization plan, and meet other conditions. The municipality can then take over a 
number of responsibilities from the central government, including management of the 
permitting process and enforcement of zoning regulations.  Although the Autonomous 
Municipalities Law has been in effect for fourteen years, only six municipalities have 
achieved autonomous status as of June 2005, and only 24 of 78 municipalities have an 
approved territorial organization plan. Fiscal limitations and human resource constraints 
apparently account for the inability or unwillingness of many municipalities to seek 
autonomous status.  
The six autonomous municipalities are Bayamón, Caguas, Carolina, Cidra, 
Guaynabo, and Ponce. An informal performance ranking (emerging from interviews) 
suggests that the permitting process functions more smoothly under the autonomous 
municipalities. Among autonomous municipalities, Ponce is generally praised for 
efficiency and speediness and is reportedly the only municipality that has fully and 
efficiently implemented the permitting process. Bayamón and Guaynabo are also classed 
as efficient, followed by Caguas and Carolina. Interviewees had little experience with 
Cidra. At the bottom, generally described as far less efficient than the autonomous   38 
municipalities, is the central government (ARPE).  Nevertheless, interviewees did not 
react positively to the idea of a decentralization of ARPE.  
The experience thus far indicates that a few municipalities can manage the 
permitting process more efficiently than the central government. However, the approach 
provided by the Autonomous Municipalities Law offers at best a partial solution to 
problems in the permitting process. Fiscal problems at the municipal level have hampered 
the process of becoming autonomous, and only two municipalities, Cidra and Guaynabo, 
became autonomous between 1999 and 2005. Over time, many public services have been 
transferred from the central government to the municipal level, but there has not been a 
corresponding increase in municipal financial resources. In fact, as we discussed in 
Section 3, certain tax incentives enacted into law have cut the flow of revenues to 
municipalities. In addition, as mentioned by several interviewees, many municipalities 
lack the scale, infrastructure and human resources to efficiently oversee the permitting 
process.  
  
4.8. Other Public Policy Responses 
In addition to the Autonomous Municipalities Law, there have been several other 
government initiatives to streamline or otherwise improve the permitting process. The 
government’s Express Center for Procedures (Centro Expreso de Trámite, CET) began 
operations in 2002. The CET follows an earlier One-Stop Procedure established in 1998 
(Law No. 264 of September 4, 1998). In principle, the CET offers concurrent project 
evaluations by nine agencies, including ARPE, and consideration of environmental 
issues. While the CET mechanism is helpful, it does not greatly simplify the permitting 
process, in large part because the CET lacks authority to grant permits. Instead, it 
functions as a messenger service to other agencies. The proponent submits basic 
information about its project over the Internet, and then visits the CET with required 
documents. The CET process reduces paperwork, but filing requirements remain 
burdensome.  For instance, consider projects that require a location consultation (consulta 
de ubicación) with the Planning Board. By obtaining agency endorsements and comments 
through the Center, the proponent need file only ten copies of certain documents instead   39 
of nineteen. Otherwise filing requirements are the same.  Most important, the CET takes 
the regulations as given and cannot issue permits on its own authority. 
In an effort to promote ethical conduct and control the operation of the agency, 
the government created the ARPE Governmental Ethics Committee and the Internal 
Auditing Office of ARPE in 2000.  Other efforts to streamline the permitting process 
include a recent reform of the Puerto Rico Environmental Public Policy Act. Prior to the 
reform, the Planning Board issued its own environmental evaluation of proposed 
construction and development projects, duplicating the efforts of other government 
agencies and increasing paperwork burdens, filing requirements and government costs. 
Effective March 2005, the reform delegates the environmental assessment to other 
government agencies, eliminating the redundant assessment by the Planning Board. This 
reform streamlines the permitting process somewhat, but it merely eliminates one of the 
many bureaucratic steps concerning the Planning Board location and approval process 
sketched above.  
Despite awareness that many elements of the permitting process are 
counterproductive, restrictive regulations continue to proliferate. For example, Law 270 
of September 14, 2004, amends the Regulations and Permits Law to require a favorable 
report, through a certification issued by the Puerto Rico Tourism Company, before 
approving a construction permit for a hotel, parador, or other project of tourist interest. 
This amendment, ostensibly designed to ensure the quality of tourist-oriented facilities, 
adds one more hurdle in an already burdensome permitting process.  
 
5.  Summary and Concluding Remarks  
Puerto Rico has struggled with an employment shortfall of stunning dimensions.  The 
employment rate among working-age persons stood at nearly 50 percent in the early 
1950s, then declined over the rest of the decade and again after 1971 to reach levels 
below 35 percent in the early 1980s. In the past thirty years, Puerto Rican employment 
rates range from 55 to 65 percent of U.S. rates. This enormous shortfall holds for men 
and women, cuts across all education groups, and is deeper for persons without a college 
degree – about four-fifths of Puerto Rico’s working-age population.    40 
To help shed light on the reasons for Puerto Rico’s persistently low rate of 
employment, we investigated several aspects of its employment structure. In this regard, 
two results stand out. First, the employment shortfall is concentrated in the private sector, 
particularly the free enterprise segment comprised of businesses that operate in the formal 
economy without large subsidies, special regulatory advantages, or heavy-handed 
oversight by government bureaucracies. Even by rather relaxed criteria, less than one 
quarter of working-age Puerto Ricans hold a job in the free enterprise segment of the 
economy. By the same criteria, more than half hold free enterprise jobs in the United 
States. The strikingly underdeveloped state of the private sector supports the view that 
Puerto Rico suffers from an inhospitable business climate.    
Second, Puerto Rico’s industry structure has for decades been grossly misaligned 
with the human capital mix of its population. The average schooling level of working-age 
persons in Puerto Rico is, and remains, below that of any state. Yet, in terms of the 
schooling intensity of its industry structure, Puerto Rico ranks among the top third of 
U.S. states. Put differently, the missing jobs in Puerto Rico are concentrated in labor-
intensive industries that rely heavily on less-educated workers.  For example, Puerto 
Rico’s employment rate in Eating, Drinking and Lodging is lower than the rate for any 
state in recent decades and less than one-third the rate in Hawaii.  The persistent inability 
of the Puerto Rican economy to generate jobs that fit the human capital mix of its 
population testifies to a profound failure of industrial and employment policy.   
The evidence does not support the view that more schooling can, by itself, resolve 
Puerto Rico’s employment problems.  Very large gains in schooling attainment in recent 
decades have accompanied very modest employment gains.  Relative to the United 
States, Puerto Rico’s employment shortfall exceeds ten percent of the population for 
college-educated persons and twenty percent or more for groups with less education.  
Thus, if and when Puerto Rico matches U.S. schooling levels, very large employment 
shortfalls will persist in the absence of deep reforms. 
No single policy or institutional deficiency fully accounts for Puerto Rico’s huge 
employment shortfall, underdeveloped private sector, and misaligned industry structure. 
Indeed, the list of significant contributing factors is long and varied:     41 
·  Large government transfer payments undermine work incentives and 
contribute to a deficit of work experience and marketable skills. 
·  Minimum wage laws discourage the hiring of less skilled workers, suppress 
the growth of employment in industries and activities that rely heavily on less 
educated workers, and diminish opportunities to acquire experience and 
training on the job.  
·  Historically, the large role for public sector employment and production in 
Puerto Rico has softened competitive pressures on the island and discouraged 
the emergence of a vibrant private sector.  
·  Section 936 of the U.S. tax code and other federal tax incentives have helped 
create an industry structure in Puerto Rico that is poorly aligned with the type 
of job opportunities needed by its population.  At best, Section 936 provided 
for a modest number of jobs in Puerto Rico at enormous cost to the U.S. 
treasury.  
·  Puerto Rico’s own tax code is replete with provisions that benefit special 
business interests at the expense of the general welfare.  These tax code 
provisions both reflect and contribute to a business climate in which 
profitability and survival too often rest on the ability to obtain favors from the 
government, rather than the ability to innovate, raise productivity, and serve 
consumers.  
·  Puerto Rico’s regulatory environment deters business entry, hampers job 
creation and erodes competitive pressures in many ways.  Occupational 
licensing requirements create artificial entry barriers, restricting the supply of 
services and raising prices to consumers. Government oversight of business 
entry and location decisions raises entry costs and affords commercial rivals 
the opportunity to block entry.  “Buy local” laws insulate business interests 
from foreign competition and raise prices for consumers.  Like many 
provisions of the tax code, these aspects of the regulatory environment serve 
special business interests at the expense of the general welfare. They reflect 
and promote a business culture focused on rent seeking.   42 
·  The permitting process – whereby the government oversees construction and 
real estate development projects, the commercial use of equipment and 
facilities, and the periodic renewal of various business licenses – suffers from 
several serious problems.  These problems raise the costs of doing business, 
undercut the drive for employment growth, and retard economic development.  
As part of our study, we interviewed more than one hundred persons who have 
expertise on or first-hand experience with the permitting process. Among the 
interviewees, there are widely shared views that the permitting process is excessively 
slow and costly, fraught with uncertainty, subject to capricious outcomes, prone to 
corruption, and susceptible to manipulation by business rivals, politicians and special 
interest groups. Independent evidence from public sources supports these claims.  
Efforts to reform the permitting process have met with very limited success. A 
partial exception is the Autonomous Municipalities Law of 1991 that allows municipal 
governments to take over much of the permitting process from the Governor’s Office, if 
the municipality meets several conditions. Many interviewees stated that the permitting 
process functions much more smoothly in a handful of autonomous municipalities. 
Fourteen years after the Law’s enactment, however, only six municipalities have 
achieved autonomous status. For reasons of insufficient scale, limited financial resources 
and lack of personnel, it is doubtful whether the other 72 municipalities can efficiently 
manage the permitting process, at least in its current form.  
Our study emphasizes employment outcomes, but the policies and institutional 
arrangements we consider also lower real incomes and living standards by undermining 
productivity.  Transfer payments and minimum wage laws lower worker productivity by 
contributing to a deficit of work experience. Special-interest tax subsidies distort market 
price signals that would otherwise guide capital and labor to their best uses, lowering 
productivity in the process. Inefficiencies in the permitting process raise the cost of doing 
business, lowering productivity directly. Regulatory entry barriers, “buy local” laws, and 
a large role for the public sector soften competitive pressures on the island.  In turn, softer 
competition weakens the pressure to innovate and provide value for customers. Artificial 
entry barriers and inefficiencies in the permitting process also retard the type of creative 
destruction process that transformed the U.S. retail sector in recent decades, bringing   43 
dramatic productivity gains for businesses and lower prices and wider product selections 
for consumers. Finally, institutional arrangements that foster rent-seek behavior lower 
productivity, because they encourage socially wasteful efforts to curry favor with 
government officials and secure preferential treatments, rather than socially productive 
efforts to better serve customers, improve products and expand markets.   44 
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 Table 1. Employment Rates in Puerto Rico Compared to the U.S. Mainland 
   
A. Percent of Persons 16-65 Years Old, All Schooling Levels, Working in: 
                             Overall                Private                Free                     Public  
                            Economy              Sector              Enterprise              Sector 
           Year         U.S.    P.R.        U.S.     P.R.         U.S.    P.R.          U.S.    P.R. 
           1980        65.2    38.5         53.0    25.3          46.9    21.8          12.2    13.2 
           1990        70.0    42.3         58.4    29.1          51.1    24.9          11.6    13.2 
           2000        68.8    37.5         58.2    28.2          51.0    24.0          10.6      9.3 
   
B. Percent of Persons 16-65 Years Old with 14+ Years of Schooling Working in: 
                             Overall                Private                Free                     Public  
                            Economy              Sector              Enterprise              Sector 
           Year         U.S.    P.R.        U.S.     P.R.         U.S.    P.R.          U.S.    P.R. 
           1980        78.8    66.1         56.8    33.8         49.6     28.7         21.9     32.3 
           1990        84.5    70.6         64.0    39.6         55.4     33.3         20.5     31.0 
           2000        82.5    61.6         63.9    40.7         56.8     35.9         18.6     20.9 
  
C. Percent of Persons 16-65 Years Old with 16+ Years of Schooling Working in:       
                             Overall                Private                Free                     Public  
                            Economy              Sector              Enterprise              Sector 
           Year         U.S.    P.R.        U.S.     P.R.         U.S.    P.R.          U.S.    P.R. 
           1980        83.4    76.8         55.5     34.1        47.9     27.5          27.9     42.6 
           1990        85.5    75.2         62.7     39.8        53.6     32.6          22.8     35.4 
           2000        83.3    65.5         63.1     41.3        55.7     35.5          20.2     24.2 
 
Notes: The Public Sector includes all employees of federal and sub-federal governments, 
and the Private Sector encompasses the rest of the economy. The Free Enterprise segment 
of the Private Sector excludes non-governmental employees in Public Utilities and 
Sanitary Services, Primary and Secondary Education, Colleges and Universities, 
Construction and several small industries for which public sector employment exceeds 35 
percent of industry employment in Puerto Rico. In 1990, these industries are Museums, 
Galleries and Zoos; Business, Trade and Vocational Schools; Bus Service and Urban 
Transit; Research, Development and Testing; Social Services, n.e.c.; Forestry, and 
Libraries. (The foregoing list is only a subset of industries with public sector employment 
shares greater than 35% in Puerto Rico.) The definition of the Free Enterprise segment 
uses a nearly identical set of excluded industries in 1980 and a slightly narrower set in 
2000. Unpaid family workers are not counted among the employed. 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations on household census data for 1980, 1990 and 2000  
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Table 4. College-Educated Workers in the Private Sector and the Free Enterprise, 
Segment as a Percentage of Persons 16-65 Years of Age 
 
  Working in the Private Sector  Working in Free Enterprise 
Year  Puerto Rico  United States  Ratio  Puerto Rico  United States  Ratio 
1980  2.9  8.1  2.8  2.3  7.0  3.0 
1990  5.2  10.1  1.9  4.3  8.7  2.0 
2000  6.9  14.2  2.1  5.9  12.6  2.1 
 
See the notes to Table 1 for a definition of the Free Enterprise segment of the economy. 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations on household census data for 1980, 1990 and 2000. 
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Table 5. Public Sector Employment in Puerto Rico Compared to the U.S. Mainland 
 
A. Public Sector Employment Relative to Total Employment 
  Government Employment as  
Percent of Paid Employment 












 Industry-Level  
Shares for Government  
Employment Evaluated  
At U.S. Industry Mix 
Puerto Rico’s  
Industry Mix 
Evaluated 
At U.S. Shares  
for Government 
Employment 
1980  17.3  13.2  33.9  30.1  24.2  26.7 
1990  16.6  11.7  31.4  27.6  22.6  25.9 
2000  15.4  11.8  24.9  21.6  19.3  21.5 
 
 
B. Government Employment as a Percent of Paid Employment in Selected Industries 
  Puerto Rico  U.S. Mainland 
Industry  1980  1990  2000  1980  1990  2000 
Electric Light and Power  93  79  83  15  13  13 
Telephone   62  65    1  1   
Wired and Other Telecom Carriers      0      0 
Sugar and Confectionary Manufacturing  55  32  16  1  1  0 
Residential Care w/o Nursing  83  46  32  30  19  12 
Nursing Facilities  70  39  33  17  10  8 
Child Day Care  66  55  55  19  8  7 
Job Training, Vocational Rehabilitation  80  62    38  24   
Vocational Rehabilitation      80      19 
Hospitals  68  53  32  28  21  15 
Museums, Galleries, and Zoos  63  48  79  37  26  34 
Sanitary Services  88  86    68  52   
Waste Management and Remediation      48      19 
Construction  20  13  6  9  7  5 
 
Notes: There are 232 Census industry codes in 1980, 243 in 1990, and 264 in 2000. Some 
industries listed in Panel B are not fully comparable over time because of changes in 
census industry classifications.  
 
Source: Authors’ calculations on household census data for 1980, 1990 and 2000. 
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Table 6. Selected Industry Shares, Puerto Rico Compared to the United States, 
























1980  7.3  5.8  3.7 – 9.9   Wyoming  Hawaii   6.4 




8.4  6.8  5.2 – 9.4  Nevada  Hawaii  5.6 
1980  0.65  0.11  0 – 1.14  Hawaii  N.Dakota  0.30 




Manufacturing  0.12  0.06  0 – 0.43  N. Dakota  Hawaii  0.20 
1980  2.0  0.2  0 – 1.3  New Jersey  Indiana  0.7 




3.0  0.3  0 – 1.5  New Jersey   Indiana  0.6 
1980  17.5  22.1  5.2 – 31.9  Rhode Island   Hawaii  5.6 




10.6  13.8  3.0 – 22.5  Indiana  Hawaii  3.0 
1980  2.3  1.4  0.9 – 2.5  Tennessee  Hawaii  1.0 
1990  2.0  1.3  0.8 – 2.4  Wyoming  Hawaii  0.9 
2000 
Utilities and  
Sanitary  
Services  1.8  1.2  0.9 – 2.2  W. Virginia  Hawaii  1.1 
1980  3.6  5.3  3.7 – 19.5  Nevada  Hawaii  11.4 




Lodging  5.5  6.1  4.5 – 14.1  Nevada  Hawaii  12.7 
1980  0.7  1.1  0.5 – 9.3  Nevada  Hawaii  1.5 




Services  0.9  1.7  0.9 – 11.9  Nevada  Hawaii  2.3 
1980  8.7  5.9  4.2 – 7.8   Alaska  Hawaii  4.5 




Schooling  7.2  6.0  4.2 – 7.9  Wyoming  Hawaii  5.8 
1980  12.5  5.2  3.5 – 14.2  Maryland  Hawaii  8.9 




10.7  4.8  3.3 – 10.8  Alaska  Hawaii  7.3 
 
 
Notes: Figures for the United States include the District of Columbia, but the 50 States 
Range does not. The state-level employment figures reflect the location of the worker’s 
residence, not the location of the job. Thus, for example, Public Administration accounts 
for a relatively high percentage of Maryland employment, because many Maryland 
residents commute to government jobs in the District of Columbia. 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations on household census data for 1980, 1990 and 2000. 
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Table 7. Employees by Establishment Size in Four Major Industry Groups, 
Puerto Rico Compared to the United States, 1997 
 
 
Percent of All Paid Employees  
in the Industry Group 











1 to 4  13.5   2.8   1.5   0.8 
5 to 9  13.9   5.0   2.5   1.1 
10 to 19  15.7   7.6   4.6   3.2 
20 to 49  20.8  15.9  10.6   7.3 
50 to 99  13.1  18.3  11.7   7.2 
100 to 249  12.1  24.4  20.4  16.2 
250 to 499   5.4  13.8  16.2  23.4 
500+   5.4  12.3  32.5  40.7 










1  0.3   1.8   1.2   0.7 
2  0.7   2.6   1.7  1.3 
3 or 4  2.1   6.2   4.2   3.3 
5 or 6  2.6   5.5   4.4   7.5 
7 to 9  3.6   7.3   5.9   6.4 
10 to 14  4.2   9.0   8.5   8.8 
15 to 19  2.6   6.7   6.7   6.6 
20 to 49  7.6  24.5  22.4  23.8 
50+  76.3  36.4  44.9  41.5 
 
Notes: Size distribution statistics are for paid employees, and they exclude unpaid family 
workers and the proprietors and partners of unincorporated businesses. The size 
categories above reflect the finest breakdowns available on a consistent basis for both the 
United States and Puerto Rico in the Economic Census of 1997. The Economic Census 
does not report measures of economic activity by firm size for Puerto Rico. 
 
Sources: The 1997 Economic Census of Puerto Rico and the Island Areas at 
http://www.census.gov/csd/ia/p_puerto97.htm, and 1997 Economic Census at 
http://www.census.gov/epcd/www/econ97.html. The Economic Census of Puerto Rico is 
not available for a more recent year as of June 2005.   56 
Table 8. Employees of Unincorporated Enterprises in Four Major Industry Groups, 
Puerto Rico Compared to the United States, 1997 
 
 
Percent of All Paid Employees  
in the Industry Group 















Partnerships  3.4  16.0  1.9  ￿ 0.6 











Proprietorships  6.2  15.6  2.8  7.8 
Unincorporated 
Partnerships  2.2  ￿ 1.1  2.3  ￿ 0.8 
 
Notes: Statistics are for paid employees, and they exclude unpaid family workers and the 
proprietors and partners of unincorporated businesses. Certain figures for Puerto Rico are 
available only within a range.  
 
Sources: The 1997 Economic Census of Puerto Rico and the Island Areas at 
http://www.census.gov/csd/ia/p_puerto97.htm, and 1997 Economic Census at 
http://www.census.gov/epcd/www/econ97.html. The Economic Census of Puerto Rico is 








Islands  OECD  Ireland  Singapore 
United 
States 
(1) Starting a Formal Business                 
Number of required procedures   7  9  11  6  4  7  5 
Time to complete procedures (days)   7  27  70  25  24  8  5 
Cost to complete procedures, excluding 
 bribes (% of annual income per capita)   7.0  10.0  62.8  8.0  10.3  1.2  0.6 
Minimum capital to register business 
 (% of annual income per capita)   1.0  0.0    28.9             44.1  0.0  0.0  0.0 
(2) Hiring and Firing Workers               
Difficulty of Hiring Index   22.0  17.0  44.4  26.2  28.0  0  0.0 
Rigidity of Hours Index   20.0  20.0  53.3  50.0  40.0  0  0.0 
Difficulty of Firing Index   20.0  20.0  34.3  26.8  20.0  0  10.0 
Rigidity of Employment Index   21.0  19.0  44.0  34.4  29.0  0  3.0 
Firing costs (weeks of wages)   0.0  51.0  70.8  40.4  52.0  4  8.0 
(3) Getting Credit               
  Cost to create and register collateral  
(% of income per capita)   0.1  5.3  19.4  5.2  3.2  0.3  0.1 
Legal Rights Index   6.0  4.0  3.8  6.3  8.0  10.0  7.0 
Credit Information Availability Index   5.0  6.0  4.7  5.0  5.0  4.0  6.0 
 Public credit registry coverage 
 (borrowers per 1000 adults)  0.0  290  85.7  76.2  0.0  0.0  0.0 
  Private credit bureau coverage 
(borrowers per 1000 adults)  643  220  325.1  577.2  1000  335  1000 
(4) Enforcing a Debt Obligation                
Number of required procedures   43  28  35  19  16  23  17 
Time to complete procedures (days)   270  305  462  229  217  69  250 
Recovery cost (% of debt)   21.0  10.4  23.3  10.8  21.1  9.0  7.5 
(5) Closing an Insolvent Business               
Time required (years)  3.8  5.6  3.7  1.7  0.4  0.8  3.0 
Cost of insolvency process 
 (% of estate value)  8.0  18.0  15.8  6.8  8.0  1  8.0 
Recovery rate (percent)  61.4  19.3  26.6  72.1  88.9  91.3  68.2 
 
Source: World Bank (2005) and the World Bank Doing Business Database at 
http://www.doingbusiness.org/Default.aspx (accessed on August 21, 2005).  
 
Notes: The indexes under (2) range from 0 to 100, with higher values indicating more rigid 
regulation. The Legal Rights Index ranges from 0 to 10, “with higher scores indicating that 
collateral and bankruptcy laws are better designed to expand access to credit.” The Credit 
Information Availability Index ranges from 0 to 6, with higher values indicating greater 
availability.  See the source publication for additional information about the indicators and their 
construction.   58 
Table 10: Illustrative Business Incentives Enacted into Law by the Puerto Rican Government 
from August 2001 to August 2002 
17-Aug-01   
Law 109  Grants a 50 percent tax credit, under certain conditions, for the acquisition of a business in 
the process of closing operations in Puerto Rico. 
Law 110  Raises the tax credit on the purchase of products manufactured in Puerto Rico by certain 
enterprises from 10 to 25 percent. 
Law 112  Grants certain businesses the option of recognizing a deduction for spending on the 
purchase or construction of buildings, structures, and equipment and machinery.  
Law 113  Grants double deductions for spending on employee training and on research and 
development.  
Law 115  Liberalizes administrative restrictions on credit cooperatives to allow them to act as agents 
in selling mortgage loans and in launching new products. 
Law 117 
Creates the Credit and Guarantees Fund for Agricultural Loans (Fondo de Credito y 
Guarantias de Prestamos Agricolas). If a farmer cannot meet a loan obligation to a private 
bank, the farmer can request a grant from the Fund to cover the debt. The Fund is 
authorized to grant up to $100 million during a four-year period. 
Law 121 
Creates the Corporation for the Development of the Arts, Sciences, and Film Industry of 
Puerto Rico. The Corporation offers incentives and administers the funds financing 
productions.   
4-Oct-01   
Law 141  Exempts associations of legal owners of vacation clubs from income taxes, promoting the 
time-share industry. 
Law 143  Exempts fees earned by financial institutions for issuing guarantees or letters of credit to 
finance tourism development projects from income taxes. 
Law 145 
Provides tax incentives to innovative technology industries that establish operations in 
Puerto Rico and that generate high skill scientific, technological, and managerial 
employment.  
3-Dec-01   
Law 169  Amends the 1994 Internal Revenue Code to grant eligible businesses a tax credit equal to 
10% of the purchase value for products manufactured in Puerto Rico.   
Law 174 
Grants excise tax exemptions to enterprises for the purchase of machinery and equipment 
to fulfill environmental, security, and health requirements. This law also grants income tax 
credits on machinery and equipment acquired for businesses devoted to call centers 
established in Puerto Rico.  
14-Dec-01   
Law 163 
Permits the Industrial Development Company (Compania de Fomento Industrial) to rent 
space at low cost to nonprofit organizations for the establishment of factories that employ 
handicapped workers.  
29-Aug-02   
Law 225 
Reduces the income tax rate on call center operations to 4 percent or 2 percent, depending 
on geographic service area. It also grants full exemption from real estate taxes, municipal 
patents, and other municipal taxes during the first five years afte the law takes effect. 
Law 226 
Grants full exemption from income taxes and partial exemption on municipal patents and 
other municipal taxes to certain businesses located in Vieques, Culebra, or any other 
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 Figure 2. Schooling Intensity of State’s Industry Mix 
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Figure 3 Schooling Intensity of State’s Industry Mix 
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￿ Figure 4: Bird’s Eye View of the Permitting Process for Construction 
and Real Estate Development Projects in Puerto Rico 
 
   1 
Notes to Figures: 
         
Figure 1: The charts show employment as a percentage of the civilian population for 
persons who are 16 years and older. Data for the Puerto Rican chart were supplied by 
Orlando Sotomayor and derive from two sources: Serie Histórica de Empleo, Desempleo 
y Grupo Trabajador, 1947-1970, Negociado de Estadisticas, Departamento de Trabajo y 
Recursos Humanos, Puerto Rico, 1978; and Serie Histórica de Empleo, Desempleo y 
Grupo Trabajador, 1970-2001, Negociado de Estadisticas, Departamento de Trabajo y 
Recursos Humanos, Puerto Rico, 2003.  Data for the U.S. chart are annual averages of 
monthly values in the Current Population Survey, as tabulated by the U.S. Bureau of 
Labor Statistics. 
 
Figure 2: Mean schooling years of persons is calculated as the simple mean years of 
completed schooling among residents who are 16-65 years old. For education codes not 
specified in terms of years of schooling, we assigned approximate values. For example, 
“associate degree” in 1990 and 2000 becomes 14 years of schooling. The schooling 
intensity of the state' s industry employment mix is an index constructed in two steps. 
First, compute the schooling intensity of each Census industry as the hours-weighted 
mean years of completed schooling among all U.S. workers in the industry. Industry 
affiliation reflects the worker’s current primary job, defined as the one that generates the 
largest earnings. The hours worked measure pertains to the reference week in the 1980 
and 1990 Census and to usual hours worked per week during the previous calendar year 
in the 2000 Census. Second, compute the schooling intensity index for the state or 
commonwealth industry distribution as the employment-weighted mean of the industry-
level schooling intensity values. By construction, an industry has the same schooling 
intensity in all states and in Puerto Rico. The index quantifies the extent to which a state' s 
industry mix tilts toward schooling-intensive industries, as measured by the industry 
workforce in the United States.  
 
Figure 3: Mean schooling years of workers is calculated as the simple mean years of 
completed schooling among employed persons who are 16-65 years old. In other 
respects, the calculations follow those used in Figure 2.  Note that the range of the 
horizontal axes is 2.0 years in Figure 3, as compared to 3.6 years in Figure 2.   
 
Figure 4: As prepared by Ricardo Solá (2004), an experienced Puerto Rican construction 
engineer. Acronyms in the diagram are defined below.   2 
 
Acronyms in Figure 4 
 
DIA: Declaración de Impacto Ambiental, Environmental Impact Statement 
CET: Centro Expreso de Trámites, Express Center for Procedures 
ARPE: Administración de Reglamentos y Permisos, Regulations and Permits 
Administration  
FCC: Federal Communications Commission 
DDEC: Departamento de Desarrollo Económico y Comercio, Department of Economic 
Development and Commerce 
CT: Compañía de Turismo, Tourism Company 
DA: Department of Agriculture 
DV: Departamento de la Vivienda, Department of Housing 
DE: Departamento de Educación, Department of Education 
FWS: US Fish and Wildlife Service 
DRD: Departamento de Recreación y Deportes, Department of Recreation and Sports 
EPA: Environmental Protection Agency 
FAA: Federal Aviation Administration  
AAA: Autoridad de Acueductos y Alcantarillados, Aqueduct and Sewage Authority 
C of E:  Corps of Engineers  
AEE: Autoridad de Energía Eléctrica, Electric Power Authority 
MUN: municipality 
DTOP: Departamento de Transportación y Obras Públicas, Department of Transportation 
and Public Works 
ACT: ACT: Autoridad de Carreteras y Transportación, Highways and Transportation 
Authority) 
ICP: Instituto de Cultura Puertorriqueña, Institute of Puerto Rican Culture 
DRNA: Departamento de Recursos Naturales y Ambientales, Department of Natural and 
Environmental Resources 
ADS: Autoridad de Desperdicios Sólidos, Solid Waste Authority 
SHIPO: State Historic Preservation Office 
CSP: Comisión de Servicio Público, Public Service Commission 
DS: Departamento d Salud, Health Department 
JCA: Junta de Calidad Ambiental, Environmental Quality Board 
CBPR: Cuerpo de Bomberos de Puerto Rico, Fire Corps of Puerto Rico 
PRTC: Puerto Rico Telephone Company 
DTRH: Departamento del Trabajo y Recursos Humanos, Department of Labor and 
Human Resources  
USPS: United States Postal Service  
 
 
 
 
 
 